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COMMENTS
COPA AND COMMUNITY STANDARDS ON THE
INTERNET: SHOULD THE PEOPLE OF MAINE
AND MISSISSIPPI DICTATE THE OBSCENITY
STANDARD IN LAS VEGAS AND NEW YORK?
William D. Deane'
"It is no exaggeration to conclude that the content on the Internet is as
diverse as human thought."' Diversity is normally considered a positive
trait; nevertheless, diverse speech is often suppressed when it's subject
matter departs too radically from accepted moral and social norms.2
Sexually explicit expression has long presented a perplexing paradox in
America. On the one hand, many people condemn such expression as
being immoral and devoid of any social or cultural value.3 On the other
hand, sex has consistently provided a profitable market for those willing
to deal in a taboo trade.4
+J.D. Candidate, May 2002, Catholic University, Columbus School of Law.
1. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
2. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 166 (1999).
Lessig argues that the First Amendment only protects against governmental restraints on
free speech. Id. at 164. However, a free speech analysis that does not consider forces
other than the government would be "radically incomplete." Id. According to Lessig
there are three other factors that play a role in constraining and protecting speech: the
market, architecture, and social norms. Id. For instance, although the law protects one's
right to advocate for the legalization of marijuana, society (one's neighbors) may disregard
such an advocate, the communications market (television stations, radio stations,
newspapers, etc.) may refuse to disseminate such views because of their unpopularity, and
as such, an advocate would have a difficult time gaining access to a wide audience. Id. at
165-66.
3. Robert Corn-Revere, New Age Comstockery, 4 COMM. L. CONSPECTUS 173, 173-
75 (1996) (defining "Comstockery" as "the overzealous moralizing like that of Anthony
Comstock, whose Society for the Suppression of Vice censored literature in America for
more than sixty years"). Anthony Comstock was the leader of an anti-obscenity
movement in the late 1800s that resulted in the banning of classic literature by authors
such as D.H. Lawrence, Theodore Dreiser, Edmund Wilson, James Joyce, Tolstoy, and
Balzac. Id. at 173. Corn-Revere warns that this "overzealous moralizing" returned to
America in the form of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. Id.
4. Just how profitable the pornography industry truly is has been a subject of
debate. Some sources have claimed that the pornography industry generates as much as
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In the second half of the 1990s, the Internet became a busy
marketplace as well.' As of August 2001, approximately 459 million
people worldwide had home-based access to the Internet. Electronic7
commerce, or e-commerce, accounted for 2.6 billion dollars in revenue
in 1996, and predictions for the year 2002 range from 200 billion to more
than 500 billion dollars.8 Vendors of sexually explicit materials have
ten to fourteen billion dollars in annual revenues. Frank Rich, Naked Capitalists, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2001, at 51; Kenneth Li, Silicone Valley: Porn Goes Public, THE
INDUSTRY STANDARD, Nov. 6, 2000, available at http://www.thestandard.com/article/
0,1902,19696,00.html. A recent Forbes.com article rebutted those figures, stating that the
industry's annual revenues are actually between 2.6 to 3.9 billion dollars. Dan Ackman,
How Big is Porn?, FORBES.COM (May 25, 2001), at http://www.forbes.com/
2001/05/25/0524porn.html. Of that amount, Forbes.com indicated that Internet
pornography makes up approximately one billion dollars. Id.
While these numbers may seem small in comparison to mainstream industries such as
traditional broadcast and cable television, which netted 32.3 billion and 45.5 billion dollars
respectively in 1999, pornographers are still clearly making a significant amount of money.
Id. Furthermore, even without huge revenues, the pornography industry, particularly
Internet pornography, can be extremely profitable for individual dealers due to low start-
up and overhead costs. Larry Rulison, Selling Sex: Webmasters Profit in Pornography,
BALTIMORE BUSINESS JOURNAL, Sept. 22, 2000, available at
http://baltimore.bcentral.com/baltimore/stories/ 2000/09/25/story2.html.
5. Angela E. Wu, Spinning a Tighter Web: The First Amendment and Internet
Regulation, 176 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 263, 267 & n.27. In layman's terms, the Internet is a
giant network of computers. HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 361
(17th ed., 200.1). More specifically "the Internet is many large computer networks joined
together over high-speed backbone data links ... The Internet, in short, is a network of
computer networks." Id. Any person with a computer, modem, telephone line, and access
to an Internet Service Provider (ISP) can log on to the Internet. Id.
6. World Wide Adoption of Internet, PCs Continues to Increase, CYBERATLAS,
(Aug. 29, 2001), at http://cyberatlas.internet.com/big__picture/geographics/print/
0,,5911_875361,00.html. Forty percent of those connected to the Internet live in the
United States and Canada. Id. In September 2001, the United States accounted for
approximately 168.6 million of those with at-home Internet access. Nielsen//NetRatings,
September Internet Universe, at http://www.nielsen-netratings.com/hot off-the-net-i.jsp
(last visited Oct. 26, 2001). Approximately fifty-eight percent of the United States
population is connected to the Internet. U.S. Internet Audience Up 16 Percent in Past
Year, CYBERATLAS, (Aug. 13, 2001), at
http://cyberatlas.internet.com/big.picture/geographics/article/0,1 323,5911 864541,00.html.
In the month of September 2001, the average American Internet user accessed the World
Wide Web nineteen times, visited forty unique sites, and spent over ten hours surfing the
Web at home. Nielsen//NetRatings, Average Web Usage, Month of September 2001, U.S.,
at http://pm.netratings.com/nnpm/owa/NRpublicreports.usagemonthly (last visited Oct. 26,
2001). Those numbers climbed even higher at work where the average user logged on
forty-three times, visited thirty-two unique sites, and spent over twenty-three hours on the
Internet. Id.
7. NEWTON, supra note 5, at 245 (defining "Electronic Commerce" as "[u]sing
electronic information technologies to conduct business between trading partners").
8. H.R. REP. NO. 105-775, at 7 (1998). See also ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473,
486 (1999), affd, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom., Ashcroft v. ACLU,
[Vol. 51:245
COPA and Community Standards on the Internet
taken notice of this bustling marketplace.9 In 1998, the World Wide
Web"' housed approximately twenty-eight thousand adult Web sites,
generating close to 925 million dollars in annual revenues."
Fearing that such sexually explicit material may have damaging effects
on children, federal and state lawmakers labored to draft laws to restrict
the dissemination of sexually explicit materials on the Internet.12 The
Child Online Protection Act of 1998 (COPA) was the second attempt by
Congress3 to safeguard children from sexually explicit material on the
Internet. 4
To ensure that COPA's restriction on speech complied with the First
15
Amendment, Congress imported language from Miller v. California, a
Supreme Court decision that defined the standard for determining
obscenity. Miller instructs that a jury should apply their own
community's standards to determine whether material is obscene.
Notwithstanding Congress' efforts, the American Civil Liberties Union
121 S. Ct. 1997 (2001) (finding that estimated total revenues from the Internet will reach
1.4 to three trillion dollars by the year 2003).
9. Li, supra note 4. According to Datamonitor, a business information company
that provides market reports and analysis, online sales of "videos, DVDs, site
subscriptions and sex toys" would amount to 1.4 billion dollars in 2000, up from 980
million dollars in 1998. Id. This increase in sales "puts online porn revenues on par with
online sales of books and way ahead of airline tickets." Id.
10. The "World Wide Web" is defined as:
[T]he universe of accessible information available on many computers spread
through the world and attached to that gigantic computer network called the
Internet. The Web has a body of software, a set of protocols and a set of defined
conventions for getting at the information on the Web. The Web uses hypertext
and multimedia techniques to make the Web easy for anyone to roam, browse
and contribute to.
NEWTON, supra note 5, at 774.
11. H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 7 (1998) (citing Wired Magazine).
12. See, e.g., The Child Online Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat.
2681-2736 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (Supp. V 2000)); The Communications
Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 560
(1996)); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2 (Michie 2001); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21
(McKinney 2000).
13. The first attempt, two sections contained within the Communications Decency
Act of 1996, was struck down as an unconstitutional restriction on speech protected by the
First Amendment. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (Reno I).
14. See 47 U.S.C. § 231 (Supp. V 2000); see also H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 5 (1998).
15. 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (vacating and remanding a criminal conviction for mailing
unsolicited sexually explicit material in violation of a California statute). In Miller, the
Court spoke of using "contemporaneous community standards" for determining obscenity.
Id. at 37. This language was incorporated into COPA. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (Supp. V
2000).
16. Miller, 413 U.S. at 37.
2001]
Catholic University Law Review
(ACLU) challenged COPA as unconstitutional under the First and Fifth
Amendments.'7 The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania granted a preliminary injunction against the
enforcement of COPA, ruling that the ACLU was likely to prevail on the
merits.' On June 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed the District Court's preliminary injunction, holding that
COPA's community standards test is likely to be found unconstitutional
as applied to the Internet. 9 On May 21, 2001, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Third Circuit properly
enjoined enforcement of COPA based on its determination that the
community standards test violates the First Amendment.
This Comment focuses on the issue that faces the Supreme Court this
term, whether COPA infringes upon the First Amendment by relying on
a community standards approach to define what material is harmful to
minors. Part I of this Comment provides background information
regarding the troubled First Amendment jurisprudence dealing with
obscenity and indecency. Part I further analyzes how legislatures and
courts have applied obscenity and indecency tests to traditional forms of
media, such as print, broadcast television and radio, cable television, and
telephony, as well as new forms of electronic communication. Part I
concludes with a discussion of COPA. Part II analyzes the community
standards test mandated by COPA and concludes that the test is
unconstitutional when applied to Internet communications. Part II also
introduces several alternative solutions to protect children from harmful
content on the Internet. Part III analyzes the several proposed
alternatives to direct government regulation of the Internet. Finally, this
Comment concludes that parental oversight combined with user-
controlled filters and tagging technology are the most effective and least
restrictive means of protecting children from harmful material on the
Internet.
I. A HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF SEXUALLY EXPLICIT SPEECH
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution grants broad protection
17. See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1999), affd, 217 F.3d 162
(3d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 121 S. Ct. 1997 (2001) (granting
a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of COPA).
18. Id.
19. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2000) (Reno I1), cert. granted sub nom.,
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 121 S. Ct. 1997 (2001) (affirming the judgment to enjoin enforcement
of COPA because of the ALCU's likelihood of success on the merits of the case).
20. Aschroft v. ACLU, 121 S. Ct. 1997 (2001).
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for the freedom of speech.21 This protection, however, is not absolute.
The courts use a number of methods to determine whether a particular
governmental restraint of speech violates the First Amendment. 2' Two
approaches in particular have been used by the Supreme Court over the
years: the "ad hoc balancing" test and the "definitional balancing" test. 4
In either case, the court balances the government's interest in restraining
speech against the speaker's interest in being heard.25
Under the ad hoc approach, courts calibrate the scales of justice by
choosing the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply before weighing the
competing interests at issue.26 The Supreme Court has mandated varying
levels of scrutiny for analyzing the constitutionality of laws restrictingfrespeh 27 Cnetbsd •• 28
free speech. 7 Content-based restrictions of speech must survive a strict
21. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part:
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ......
U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
22. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("[I]t is well
understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances.").
23. See generally HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW
§ 1.2 (Practitioner's ed. 1999) (describing the varying methodologies for interpreting the
text of the First Amendment).
24. Id. The ad hoc approach asks the judiciary to determine which of the two
competing interests, the government's interest in restricting speech or the First
Amendment's interest in protecting free speech, are more important under the particular
circumstances of each case. Id. at 9 n.17 (citing Am. Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382, 399 (1950)). The definitional approach simply categorizes certain types of
speech as unprotected by the First Amendment because, as a rule, the government's
interest outweighs the value of those particular classes of speech. Id. at 9 n.18 (citing
William T. Mayton, From a Legacy of Suppression to the "Metaphor of the Fourth Estate,"
39 STAN. L. REV. 139, 140 n.9 (1986); Frederick F. Schauer, The Aim and the Target in
Free Speech Methodology, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 562, 562 n.4 (1989)).
25. Id. at 9 nn. 11-18.
26. Id. at 9.
27. Compare United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000), and
Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (applying strict
scrutiny analysis to laws restricting speech on the basis of the content of that speech), with
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (applying intermediate scrutiny to
the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948), and Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (explaining that intermediate scrutiny is used when
analyzing content-neutral regulations).
28. Laws are content-based when they disfavor certain types of speech as against
other types of speech because of the ideas or views that that particular type of speech
expresses. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 811 (holding that laws restricting speech as "defined by its
content" are content based restrictions); Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 643 (holding that
regulations that "suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech
because of its content" are content-based and thus, subject to strict scrutiny); Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992) (elucidating that laws are content-based when they
disfavor certain expressions due to their ideas or opinions); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
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scrutiny analysis . Strict scrutiny, the highest standard of review the
Court applies, requires the government to narrowly tailor its regulation
to promote a compelling governmental interest and to use the least
restrictive means necessary to serve that interest.3" Generally, any law
restraining speech on the basis of its content must meet this heightened
standard of review in order to be found constitutional.31 Content-neutral
restrictions," on the other hand, are analyzed under a less rigorous• 33
standard labeled intermediate scrutiny.
321 (1988) (arguing that content-based speech "focuses only on the content of the speech
and the direct impact that speech has on its listeners").
29. See, e.g., Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 ("Since § 505 is a content-based speech
restriction, it can stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny."); Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 642
("Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress,
disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.").
30. See, e.g., Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 ("If a statute regulates speech based on its
content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest .... If
a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must
use that alternative."); Reno 1, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) ("[The CDA's] burden on adult
speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in
achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve."); Sable, 492 U.S. at
126 (indicating that "[t]he Government may ... regulate the content of constitutionally
protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least
restrictive means to further the articulated interest"); see also Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 22-23 (1971) (holding that the government lacked a compelling reason to bar a
profane work printed on a tee shirt).
31. See supra note 29.
32. Content-neutral laws are those laws that regulate speech "without reference to
the ideas or views expressed." Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 643; see also Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (holding that the government may impose
"reasonable restrictions" on the time, place, and manner of speech in a public forum so
long as those restrictions are not aimed at the content of the speech); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986) (holding that a zoning ordinance concerned
with the "secondary effects" of adult movie theaters was a content-neutral "time, place,
and manner regulation"); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 804 (1984) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public
property "is neutral - indeed it is silent - concerning any speaker's point of view");
Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648-49 (1981) (holding
that a regulation concerning solicitation at a state fair was a permissible time, place, and
manner restriction). The Heffron Court said that the regulation was content-neutral
because it "applie[d] evenhandedly to all who wish to distribute and sell written materials
or to solicit funds." Id.
33. See Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 642 (noting that laws that do not regulate speech
on the basis of content are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny "because in most
cases [those laws] pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from
the public dialogue"); see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-47; United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Under intermediate scrutiny, a government law or regulation
comports with the First Amendment "if it furthers an important or substantial government
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
[Vol. 51:245
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The definitional balancing test contemplates that certain classes of
speech are simply not protected by the First Amendment.34  Over the
years, the Supreme Court has identified several categories of speech that
are not afforded First Amendment protection, including: libelous
speech,35 incitement,36 so called "fighting words," and obscene speech.38
A. Regulation of Obscene Speech
1. The First Amendment Does Not Protect Obscene Speech
Using a definitional balancing approach, the Supreme Court, in Roth v.
United States, 9 held that obscene speech is not protected by the First
Amendment. a°  Affirming the criminal conviction of a book andmagazine publisher, the majority defined obscenity as "material which
essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id.
34. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (stating that "[tihere
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting'
words").
35. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (noting that libelous or
defamatory communications are not "within the area of constitutionally protected
speech"). But see N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268-70, 284-86 (1964) (raising the
bar for libel plaintiffs by requiring them to prove "actual malice" on the part of the
publisher).
36. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (holding that the government
may outlaw speech that creates a "clear and present danger" of inciting others to criminal
or destructive behavior). But see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969)
(holding that in order to punish a speaker for incitement, the government must prove that
(1) the speaker intended to cause imminent lawless action and (2) that such lawless action
was likely to occur under the circumstances).
37. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (holding speech that by its "very utterance
inflict[s] injury or tend[s] to incite an immediate breach of the peace" is not protected by
the First Amendment).
38. See discussion infra Part I.A.1.
39. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
40. Id. at 485. Roth, a book and magazine publisher, had been convicted of
circulating obscene materials through the mail in violation of the Comstock Act, codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1994), as amended. Id. at 480. Rejecting Roth's argument that the
Comstock Act infringed upon the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Supreme Court
held that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press."
Id. at 485. The Court did, however, emphasize that "sex and obscenity are not
synonymous." Id. at 487. Thus, sexually oriented material that does not rise to the level
of obscenity retains First Amendment protection. Id. This left the Court with the difficult
task of defining exactly what should be considered obscene. The task is difficult because
the determination of what is obscene versus what is art or science is a subjective
determination often viewed differently from one set of eyes to the next. See Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (arguing that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric").
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deals with sex in a manner appealing to [the] prurient interest."4 Justice
Brennan defined prurient as "material having a tendency to excite lustful
thoughts. 42  In an attempt to safeguard the First Amendment's
protection of free speech, the Roth Court constructed a standard for
judging whether sexually explicit expression rises to the level of
obscenity: "[W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to [the] prurient interest., 43  The "contemporary
community standards" language remains to this day despite the Court's
struggle to redefine obscenity in the years following Roth.
2. The Supreme Court's Struggle to Define Obscenity
For sixteen years following Roth (1957 to 1973), the Supreme Court
44struggled to apply a consistent obscenity standard in individual cases.
Although a clear majority of the Court agreed that obscenity was not
protected speech,45  and that the Roth standard governed the
determination of obscenity, the Court could not reach a consensus on
46how to apply the Roth standard.
41. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487.
42. Id. at 487 n.20 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(Unabridged, 2d ed., 1949)) (defining prurient as: "Itching; longing; uneasy with desire or
longing; of persons, having itching, morbid, or lascivious longings; of desire, curiosity, or
propensity, lewd"). A more contemporary definition of prurient is: "having or expressing
lustful ideas or desires; tending to excite lust." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d College ed., 1991).
43. Roth, 354 U.S. at 488-89.
44. See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 79-83 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (describing the diverging methods used by Supreme Court Justices to separate
obscene speech from protected speech); see also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
390 U.S. 676, 704-05 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (admitting
that the Roth standard has "produced a variety of views among the members of the Court
unmatched in any other course of constitutional adjudication").
45. Only Justices Black and Douglas rejected the Roth holding outright. They
maintained that the First Amendment provides unconditional protection of free speech
and does not withhold protection from obscene speech. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at
80 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the conflicting views on the Court concerning the
regulation of obscene speech); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476, 482 (1966)
(dissenting opinions); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (Black, J., concurring);
Roth, 354 U.S. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
46. Justice Harlan opined that the federal government had the authority to restrict
distribution of "hard core" pornography only, while the states could ban "any material
which, taken as a whole, has been reasonably found in state judicial proceedings to treat
with sex in a fundamentally offensive manner, under rationally established criteria for
judging such material." Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 80-81 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citing Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 204 (dissenting opinion); Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 493
(dissenting opinion); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 215 (1964) (dissenting
[Vol. 51:245
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One of the principal disagreements between the Justices was whether a
local or national standard should apply to the community standards test.
Justices Harlan and Brennan advanced a national standard, reasoning
that to apply different standards of First Amendment protection from
one community to the next would violate the Constitution.47 Chief
Justice Warren, conversely, argued in favor of a local standard because
he believed it would be problematic to identify a single "provable
'national standard.' 48 After a failed effort to clarify the Roth standard in
1966,49 the Court completely abandoned efforts to reach a uniform
standard.5o
opinion); Roth, 354 U.S. at 496 (separate opinion)).
Justice Stewart, on the other hand, believed that both the state and federal government
could only regulate hard core pornography. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 81 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (citing Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 197; Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 497 (dissenting
opinion)).
47. See Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(arguing that a local standard of obscenity would have "the intolerable consequence of
denying some sections of the country access to material, there deemed acceptable, which
in others might be considered offensive to prevailing community standards of decency");
see also Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 194 (arguing that a local community standard of obscenity
would chill free speech).
[T]o sustain the suppression of a particular book or film in one locality would
deter its dissemination in other localities where it might be held not obscene,
since sellers and exhibitors would be reluctant to risk criminal conviction in
testing the variation between the two places .... The result would thus be "to
restrict the public's access to forms of the printed word which the State could not
constitutionally suppress directly."
Id. (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959)).
48. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 200 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Warren
conceded Justice Brennan's argument that a local standard "may well result in material
being proscribed as obscene in one community but not in another," but he countered that
the communities of America "are in fact diverse, and it must be remembered that, in cases
such as this one, the Court is confronted with the task of reconciling conflicting rights of
the diverse communities within our society and of individuals." Id. at 200-01 (Warren,
C.J., dissenting).
49. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). In Memoirs, a three-justice
plurality (Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Fortas) attempted to expand
upon the Roth standard. Id. at 418. The Memoirs plurality established a three-part test
for determining obscenity:
[I]t must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive
because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the
description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly
without redeeming social value.
Id. According to the plurality, all three prongs had to be met before a form of
expression could be branded obscene. Id. Notwithstanding their efforts, the Memoirs test
never garnered a majority of the Court. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-25 (1973).
50. See Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770-71 (1967) (per curiam). In Redrup,
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Finally, in 1973, a majority of the Supreme Court agreed on an
obscenity test that is still intact today.' In Miller v. California,52 the
Court established a three-pronged test for determining whether sexually
explicit material is obscene:
(a) [W]hether "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value. 3
While announcing that obscenity would be measured according to the
contemporary standards of each individual local community, the Miller
Court acknowledged that First Amendment protections do not vary from
one community to the next. The Court rationalized, however, that the
United States is "too big and too diverse" to mandate a uniform national
obscenity standard. 5 Moreover, the contemporary community standards
the Court abandoned attempts to agree on a uniform definition of obscenity; instead, each
justice simply applied their own separate definition on a case-by-case basis. See id.
During the period following Redrup, the Court would release a per curiam opinion in
favor of the side garnering at least five votes. Id. Twenty-eight subsequent cases followed
the Redrup technique. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 82 n.8.
51. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 25 ("[T]oday, for the first time since Roth was decided in
1957, a majority of this Court has agreed on concrete guidelines to isolate 'hard core'
pornography from expression protected by the First Amendment.").
Similar to Roth, the Supreme Court in Miller affirmed the conviction of a publisher
accused of disseminating sexually explicit materials through the mail. Id. at 16-20.
52. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
53. Id. at 24 (citations omitted). The Court also provided examples of how states
could write statutes regulating obscene material. Id. at 25. The Court announced that the
following classes of communication could be regulated by state governments: "(a)
Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or
perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of
masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." Id.
On the same day as the Miller decision, the Court also held, in Paris Adult Theatre, that
state governments may regulate or ban outright the presentation of obscene subject matter
(i.e., pornographic films) in areas of public accommodation, even if the audience is fully
composed of consenting adults. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 69. The Court held that,
so long as the material prohibited falls within Miller's definition of obscenity, nothing
precludes the states from regulating or prohibiting its exhibition to the public. Id. Taken
together, the Supreme Court's decisions in Miller and Paris Adult Theatre make clear that
state and federal governments can constitutionally restrain the dissemination of obscene
material; even when such material is disseminated to consenting adults only.
54. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30.
55. Id. (holding that determining what appeals to the "prurient interest" or is
"patently offensive" are questions of fact that cannot be determined under a national
standard). The Court rejected the notion of a national standard as being unworkable
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approach adopted in Miller attempted to give the people of each
individual community some control over the types of materials that
entered into their community.
56
The Court implemented the community standards language to instruct
triers of fact that they must apply an external objective standard, not
simply their own subjective opinion, when determining whether sexually
explicit expression appeals to the prurient interest and is patently
offensive.57 Under Miller, the trier of fact (most often a jury) must look
to the aggregate standard of a given community-the average beliefs of
the community affected by the expression in question." The Miller
Court, however, left open the definition of "community."5 9  In
subsequent cases, therefore, the Court stated that the jury instructions
need not identify the specific community to be applied. 60
3. Variable Obscenity: The Government's Interest in Protecting
Children
Protecting children from the harmful effects of sexually explicit speech
has long been a leading concern of both state and federal lawmakers."
Such legislative efforts have met with varying degrees of success at the
Supreme Court.62  In Ginsberg v. New York,63 the Court altered the
because, "our Nation is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect
that such standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation, even
assuming the prerequisite consensus exists." Id.
56. Phillip E. Lewis, A Brief Comment on the Application of the "Contemporary
Community Standard" to the Internet, 22 CAMPBELL L. REV. 143, 160 (1999) (stating that
the reasoning behind the community standards model is to allocate to local residents some
control over the type of businesses that may operate in their community).
57. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 305 (1977); Miller, 413 U.S. at 24;
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489-90 (1957).
58. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
59. Id. at 31. In Miller, the Supreme Court defined the community at issue as the
State of California. Id.
60. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974) (noting that "Miller approved the
use of such [state-wide community] instructions; it did not mandate their use"); Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974) (allowing each juror to draw on the standard from
the "community or vicinage from which he comes").
61. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 806 (2000) (discussing
the constitutionality of a federal law that sought to restrict children from viewing "sexually
oriented programming"); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (discussing the
validity of a New York statute that proscribed the sale of obscene materials to minors).
62. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 806-07 (striking down as unconstitutional a provision of
the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which sought to protect children from viewing
adult cable television programming that was only partially scrambled); Reno 1, 521 U.S.
844, 849 (1997) (overturning as unconstitutional two provisions of the Communications
Decency Act that attempted to protect children from sexually explicit materials on the
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application of the Roth obscenity test when analyzing laws aimed at
protecting children. 4 In that case, a magazine vendor was convicted of
selling sexually explicit magazines to a sixteen-year-old boy in violation
65of New York Penal Law. The Court acknowledged that the magazines
were not obscene by adult standards and found that the New York
statute would not prohibit the sale of such magazines to adults.66 The
Court, however, endorsed a technique called "variable obscenity,"
whereby a state may prohibit the distribution of sexually explicit
materials to children, even if those materials would not be obscene when
distributed to adults.67  Under this standard, determining whether
material is obscene is considered from the point of view of a minor, not
that of an adult.68  Although the Court decided Ginsberg before it
decided Miller, the variable obscenity standard survives today.69
Internet); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 732-33
(1996) (upholding one provision of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 and striking down two others that were designed to shield
children from indecent programming on cable television); Sable Communications of Cal.,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 117 (1989) (upholding as constitutional an amendment to
section 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 that banned interstate transmission of
obscene commercial telephone messages for the purpose of protecting minors, but striking
down that portion of section 223(b) that banned indecent telephone messages); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750-51 (1978) (affirming an FCC declaratory order issued
against a radio station for broadcasting an indecent program during the day-time hours
when children were most likely to be listening); Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 637-38 (upholding a
New York statute prohibiting the sale of obscene materials to minors); see also Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
63. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
64. Id. at 635-37.
65. Id. at 631 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h (1909)).
66. Id. at 634-35.
67. Id. at 636.
68. Id.
[M]aterial which is protected for distribution to adults is not necessarily
constitutionally protected from restriction upon its dissemination to children. In
other words, the concept of obscenity or of unprotected matter may vary
according to the group to whom the questionable material is directed or from
whom it is quarantined. Because of the State's exigent interest in preventing
distribution to children of objectionable material, it can exercise its power to
protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of its community by barring the
distribution to children of books recognized to be suitable for adults.
Id. (quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1966)).
But see Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (cautioning that legislation designed
to protect children from obscenity must be "reasonably restricted to the evil with which it
is said to deal," so as not to "reduce the adult population ... to reading only what is fit for
children").
69. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("We
have recognized that there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and
pyschological well-being of minors. This interest extends to shielding minors from the
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4. Obscenity in the Home
An exception exists to the general rule that the First Amendment does
not protect obscene speech from governmental restraint.70 In Stanley v.
Georgia," the Supreme Court reversed a conviction for the knowing
possession of obscene materials.72 In Stanley, state and federal agents,
acting pursuant to the authority of a search warrant, entered Stanley's
home and discovered sexually explicit films unrelated to the subject of
the warrant]3 The Supreme Court reversed Stanley's conviction, holding
that the "First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere
private possession of obscene material a crime. 7 4  Justice Marshall,
writing for the Court, recognized a distinction between the private
possession of obscene materials and the public distribution,
dissemination, or vending of such materials.75  Justice Marshall
rationalized this distinction based on two fundamental rights: "the right
to receive information and ideas," and the right to privacy.76 Stanley,
therefore, limited the government's ability to regulate obscene material
to those instances where the material has some contact with the public.77
influence of literature that is not obscene by adult standards.").
70. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that a state cannot outlaw
the private possession of obscene material).
71. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
72. Id. at 568. Stanley was convicted under a Georgia law that read in relevant part:
"Any person.., who shall knowingly have possession of ... any obscene matter... shall,
if such person has knowledge or reasonably should know of the obscene nature of such
matter, be guilty of a felony ..... Id. at 558 n.1 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6301 (Supp.
1968)).
73. Id. at 558.
74. Id. at 568. The Court stated further:
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what
films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of
giving government the power to control men's minds .... Whatever the power of
the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality,
it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a
person's private thoughts.
Id. at 565-66.
75. Id. at 560-62. Justice Marshall acknowledged that the government had an
important interest in regulating the commercial distribution of obscene material. Id. at
563-64. Nevertheless, Marshall argued that the government's interest did not extend into
the privacy of one's home. Id. at 564.
76. Id. Justice Marshall wrote that the "right to receive information and ideas,
regardless of their social worth . . . is fundamental to our free society . . . . [A]Iso
fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted
governmental intrusions into one's privacy." Id.
77. Id. at 568 (stating that while "the States retain broad power to regulate obscenity;
that power simply does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of
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Nevertheless, the Court has narrowly applied any limits on government
regulation of obscenity."'
B. Regulation of Indecent Speech
Sexually explicit speech or expression that does not meet all three
prongs of the Miller test generally falls into a category commonly labeled
"indecency."" Unlike obscene speech, which does not receive any First
Amendment protection, the Court has accorded indecent speech a
qualified level of First Amendment protection. In FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation,1 the Court supplied a broad definition of indecency:
"nonconformance with accepted standards of morality," including non-
sexual references to excretory functions. The Pacifica Court added that
"indecency is largely a function of context - it cannot be adequately
judged in the abstract. '' 3
The context of where and when indecent speech was uttered was of
critical importance to the Pacifica case. 4  The FCC had issued a
declaratory order against the Pacifica Foundation for the daytime
broadcast of comedian George Carlin's monologue entitled "Filthy
Words." '
his own home").
78. See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65-66 (1973) (declining to extend a
"zone of privacy" to wherever consenting adults may go to view sexually explicit matter)
The protection offered by Stanley only exists within one's home. Id.; see also United
States v. 12 200-foot Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973) (refusing to
extend Stanley to the importation of obscene materials); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S.
351, 355 (1971) (holding that mailing obscene materials is public conduct and is therefore
not protected by the Stanley exception).
79. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 738-41 (1978).
80. Id. at 744-46.
81. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
82. Id. at 740, 743.
83. Id. at 742, 747 (establishing that the First Amendment protection afforded
"patently offensive sexual and excretory language" may fluctuate depending upon the
context within which the speech was uttered).
The FCC currently defines "indecency" as: "language or material that, in context,
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs." In re
Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broad. Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 8 F.C.C.R.
704, 705 n.10, vacated sub noni. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, II F.3d 170 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
84. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729-30. The indecent monologue at issue was broadcast over
the radio at approximately two o'clock on a Tuesday afternoon. Id. at 729. A man who
had been driving with his young son when the broadcast aired filed a complaint with the
FCC. Id. at 730.
85. Id. at 730 (citing In re Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station
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A plurality of the Supreme Court upheld the FCC order, reasoning
that the broadcast of an indecent program, at a time when children were
likely to hear it, was the equivalent of a nuisance." Therefore, the FCC• 81
was within its authority to impose sanctions. Justice Stevens asserted
8that the FCC order was content-neutral, because it was a reaction to the
context of Carlin's monologue, not its content."' Justice Stevens further
stated that indecent speech was less deserving of protection than other
speech; he argued that sexually explicit speech and speech referring to
excretory functions "surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment
concern."
90
C. Application of the Obscenity and Indecency Standards to Traditional
Forms of Media
The First Amendment does not protect the free expression of obscene
speech in any medium.9' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not
treated all mediums uniformly. The Court has faced the issues of
WBAI, 56 F.C.C. 2d 94, 99 (F.C.C. 1975)). The FCC found the broadcast to be indecent
and in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994). Section 1464 provides that: "Whoever utters
any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1464
(1994).
86. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 (maintaining that "a 'nuisance may be merely a right
thing in the wrong place, - like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard."') (quoting
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,388 (1926)).
87. Id. at 750-51. The plurality opinion emphasized the narrowness of the Pacifica
holding, limiting it to the context of the situation (especially the time of day), the content
of the program, and the nature of broadcasting. Id. at 750.
88. See discussion supra note 32.
89. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746-48.
90. Id. at 743. Justice Stevens argued that restrictions on indecent speech only alter
the form of the speech, not its substantive content. Id. at 743 n.18. According to Justice
Stevens, most of the thoughts conveyed by indecent speech could be expressed without the
use of offensive language. Id. Justice Stevens cited to Justice Murphy's statement in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, that indecent expressions "are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality." Id. at 746 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). But
see Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (establishing that
indecent expression is protected by the First Amendment and content-based
governmental restrictions of that expression are subject to strict scrutiny). The Sable
Court, applying strict scrutiny to a federal statute regulating obscene and indecent
telephone messages, stated that the government may only "regulate the content of
constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses
the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest." Id.
91. See, e.g., Sable, 492 U.S. at 125; Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
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obscenity and indecency in several different mediums: print, broadcast
television and radio, cable television, telephony, and, most recently, the
Internet.12 Due to the distinct characteristics of each medium, the Court
has applied differing standards of First Amendment protection. 9 The
following discussion compares the different standards that are applied to
each medium.
1. Broadcast Versus Print Media
Print mediums, particularly newspapers, have traditionally enjoyed the
, 94
most rigorous First Amendment protection. Television and radio
broadcasters, on the other hand, have not received the same level of
protection from the Court.9 The very nature of broadcasting was
important to the Supreme Court's contextual analysis of the indecent
radio broadcast in Pacifica." Declining to apply strict scrutiny to the
FCC order, Justice Stevens emphasized three rationales for a lower level
of First Amendment protection for broadcasting: (1) that broadcasting
has traditionally been subject to regulation in the public interest; (2) the
pervasive nature of broadcasting and its ability to invade the privacy of
one's home; and (3) its easy accessibility to children. 9 According to
Justice Stevens, because broadcast radio enters private homes "the
92. See, e.g., Reno 1, 521 U.S. 844, 844 (1997) (striking down as unconstitutional a
federal statute restricting indecent and patently offensive material on the Internet);
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 733 (1996)
(upholding in part and striking down in part a federal statute restricting sexually explicit
programming on cable television); Sable, 492 U.S. at 117 (upholding in part and striking
down in part a federal statute restricting obscene and indecent telephone messages);
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 741 (upholding an FCC declaratory order against a radio station that
had broadcast an indecent program).
93. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
94. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (holding that
governmental prior restraints imposed upon a newspaper "come[] to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against ... constitutional validity"); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147,
153-55 (1959) (striking down as unconstitutional a city ordinance that made it unlawful for
bookstores to possess obscene or indecent books); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715-16
(1931) (holding that the First Amendment bars prior restraints of the press and that such
restraints are only permissible in exceptional cases, such as publications threatening
national security).
95. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 ("[O]f all forms of communication, it is broadcasting
that has received the most limited First Amendment protection."); see also Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (stating that "[ajlthough broadcasting is
clearly a medium affected by a First Amendment interest differences in the characteristics
of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them")
(citation omitted).
96. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-50. See discussion supra Part I.B.
97. Id. at 731, 748-50.
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individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment
rights of an intruder."98 Justice Stevens also cited broadcasting's ready
availability to children and its ability to "enlarge[] a child's vocabulary in
an instant," as a reason for a lesser standard of review. 99
A comparison of two earlier Supreme Court cases provides the best
illustration of the disparate treatment between newspaper publishers and
broadcasters. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,'0° the Court upheld
the FCC's fairness doctrine, requiring broadcasters to (1) air issues of
great public importance and (2) take steps to assure that the contrasting
views concerning those issues are equally presented.'0 ' The Court also
upheld a corollary to the fairness doctrine, the personal attack rule,
requiring broadcasters to furnish to a person who had been personally
attacked on the broadcaster's station an equal opportunity to respond. 1
2
Just five years later, in a strikingly similar case, Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo,O3 the Court held that a state right-of-reply statute
constituted an unconstitutional infringement of the First Amendment
rights of newspaper publishers.'O°
The Court distinguished Red Lion from Miami Herald based on the
issue of spectrum scarcity. The Red Lion Court reasoned that, due to the
98. Id. at 748 (citation omitted). Justice Stevens argued that turning off the radio or
changing stations after realizing the nature of the program was an insufficient remedy
because damage could be done instantaneously. Id. at 748-49. Moreover, prior warnings
concerning the nature of the broadcast would prove ineffective because of the ability of
the broadcast audience to tune in and out at any time. Id.
99. Id. at 749-50. Justice Stevens acknowledged the impossibility of restricting
broadcast dissemination to children without also restricting its dissemination to adults;
however, he found solace in knowing that adults who wished to listen to such broadcasts
could still do so by purchasing tapes, going to nightclubs, or listening to the program in the
late evening hours when its broadcast would not be a nuisance. Id. at 750 n.28.
100. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The case reviewed the "fairness doctrine" as promulgated by
the FCC. See id. at 369. The Court examined an FCC order requiring a radio station to
furnish a person who had been personally attacked on that station with an equal
opportunity to respond, and the FCC's codification of the "personal attack" rule in 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (all identical). Id. at 375, 386. Essentially, the
fairness doctrine requires that the "discussion of public issues be presented on broadcast
stations, and that each side of those issues must be given fair coverage." Id. at 369.
101. Id. at 388-89, 391.
102. Id. at 373-75 (citing 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679); see also id. at 389-
91.
103. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
104. Id. at 257-58. The right-of-reply statute at issue required that a newspaper
provide space for a reply to any political candidate attacked by that newspaper. Id. at 243.
The Miami Herald Court held that the right-of-reply statute interfered with the editorial
discretion of the publisher. Id. at 257-58. Furthermore, the Court held that the statute
created a chilling effect on the publisher's First Amendment rights because it implicitly
discouraged newspapers from criticizing political candidates. Id.
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limited number of broadcasting frequencies, the FCC's regulation of the
broadcasting industry "enhance[d] rather than abridge[d] the freedoms
of speech and press protected by the First Amendment.""" The Red
Lion Court found that because the federal government had the
responsibility to license the broadcast spectrum in the public interest,' 6
the government was authorized to regulate the use of the spectrum to
ensure it was used to serve the public interest.' 7 Furthermore, the Court
emphasized that "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. ' "
Pacifica and Red Lion notwithstanding, the government does not have
a free hand in regulating the content of broadcast television and radio."'9
The Pacifica Court specifically held that the FCC order in that case was
not a content-based restriction. The Court also limited its holding to
the context of the circumstances of that particular case."' Additionally,
in recent years both the FCC and the courts have questioned the vitality
of the scarcity doctrine."2
105. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 375, 388-89. By the 1920s, broadcasters outnumbered
available frequencies. Id. at 388. This congestion led to the passage of the Radio Act of
1927 and the Communications Act of 1934, allowing the federal government to take
control of the spectrum and license it to broadcasters in service of the public interest. Id.
at 387-89, 396.
106. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1994). Due to the spectrum scarcity dilemma, Congress
delegated authority to the FCC to license broadcasters. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1994). Under
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, the FCC has the authority to grant licenses
to broadcasters to serve the "public interest, convenience, and necessity." 47 U.S.C. §
309(a) (1994).
107. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388-89. The Court stated that "[b]ecause of the scarcity of
radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of
others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium." Id. at 390.
108. Id. "Licenses to broadcast do not confer ownership of designated frequencies,
but only the temporary privilege of using them." Id. at 394 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 301). The
Court found that "[n]o one has a First Amendment right to a license or to monopolize a
radio frequency; to deny a station license because 'the public interest' requires it 'is not a
denial of free speech."' Id. at 389 (quoting Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
227 (1943)).
109. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750-51 (1978) (emphasizing the
narrowness of the Court's holding and limiting that holding to the context of that
particular case).
110. Id. at 746 ("If there were any reason to believe that the Commission's
characterization of the Carlin monologue as offensive could be traced to its political
content .... First Amendment protection might be required. But that is simply not this
case."). Justice Stevens further explained that the FCC was not objecting to Carlin's
viewpoint, but only "to the way in which it is expressed." Id. at 746 n.22.
111. Id. at 746-48.
112. See Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987) (questioning the Supreme Court's reliance on scarcity as a
rationale for distinguishing between the broadcast and print media). Indeed, the FCC
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2. Telephone Messages
In Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC,"3 the Supreme
Court upheld a federal statute banning obscene interstate commercial
telephone messages."14 The Court, however, unanimously struck down
that portion of the statute banning indecent interstate commercial
telephone messages." 5 In contrast to the plurality opinion in Pacifica, "6
the Sable Court held that "[s]exual expression which is indecent but not
obscene is protected by the First Amendment."'"7 Distinguishing Sable
from Pacifica, the Court noted that sexually explicit dial-in telephone
services are neither as pervasive nor as accessible to children as radio
broadcasts."8 The Sable Court placed the burden of proof on the
government to show that less restrictive means would not effectively
protect children from indecent material, and extended very little
deference to the "conclusory statements" of legislators." 9 Thus, Sable
established that strict scrutiny must be used to analyze content-based
120restrictions on indecent speech transmitted over the telephone.
3. Cable Television
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,'2 ' the Supreme Court
rejected the government's argument that the same "less rigorous"
abandoned the fairness doctrine in 1987, after the Commission found the doctrine
unconstitutional. In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, 5057-58
(1987). Furthermore, the corollaries to the fairness doctrine, the personal attack and
political editorial rules, were later repealed by a mandamus order of the District of
Columbia Circuit. See RTNDA v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
113. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
114. Id. at 124. The federal statute at issue was the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1982). Congress designed the statute to protect minors from
accessing "dial-a-porn." Sable, 492 U.S. at 120.
115. Sable, 492 U.S. at 131.
116. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743-46.
117. Id. at 126.
118. Id. at 127-28 (rationalizing that a listener must take affirmative steps in order to
receive the indecent messages of a dial-a-porn service). Comparing the pornographic dial-
in service to indecent or obscene broadcasting, the Court reasoned that "[u]nlike an
unexpected outburst on a radio broadcast, the message received by one who places a call
to a dial-a-porn service is not so invasive or surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener
from avoiding exposure to it." Id. at 128.
119. Id. at 129-30 ("Deference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry
when First Amendment rights are at stake.") (citing Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978)).
120. Id. at 126 ("The Government may ... regulate the content of constitutionally
protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least
restrictive means to further the articulated interest.").
121. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
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standard of First Amendment scrutiny that applied to broadcast
regulations should also apply to cable television regulations. 22 In Turner
Broadcasting the plaintiff challenged sections four and five of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (Cable
Act),'23 which required cable television operators to dedicate a specified
portion of their channels to local commercial and public broadcast
stations. 24 The Turner Broadcasting Court, however, did not apply strict
scrutiny because it found the "must-carry" provisions were content-
neutral, and therefore were only subject to intermediate scrutiny.
2
1
Two years later, in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 26 a plurality of the Supreme Court struck down
two out of three provisions of the 1992 amendment to the Cable Act of
1984. 2 The Court upheld the first provision, allowing cable operators to
122. Id. at 637-38. The Court reasoned that cable television does not have the same
inherent characteristics that lead to the regulation of broadcasting. Id. at 637-39. Due to
advances in technology, the availability of cable channels is not scarce like the broadcast
spectrum. Id. at 638-39. "Nor is there any danger of physical interference between two
cable speakers attempting to share the same channel." Id. at 639.
123. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (1994).
124. Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 630-34. In the late 1980s, Congress became concerned
that over-the-air broadcast television stations were increasingly unable to compete with
cable television operators for a viewing audience. Id. at 632-33. Congress believed
regulation of the cable television market "was necessary to correct this competitive
imbalance." Id. at 633. Thus, under the Cable Act, cable television operators were
required to carry the signals of a specified number of local commercial broadcast
television stations. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1). Similarly, the Cable Act required cable
television operators to carry the signals of a number of noncommercial educational
television stations. 47 U.S.C. § 535(b)-(c).
125. Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 661-62. Intermediate scrutiny involves a two-part
analysis with the second part being a balancing test. Id. at 662. First, the statute in
question must further an "important or substantial governmental interest," and that
interest must be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression." Id. (quoting United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). Second, the restriction on free speech must
be "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id. (quoting O'Brien,
391 U.S. at 377). The Turner Court emphasized that this analysis did not require- the
statute to use the least restrictive means possible to achieve its purpose. Id. Essentially,
intermediate scrutiny requires an important governmental interest furthered by narrowly
tailored means. See id.
126. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
127. Id. at 733. Justice Breyer, writing for the plurality, refused to apply one of the
traditional First Amendment standards of review. Id. at 741-42. Instead, Justice Breyer
attempted to lay down a flexible standard of review to allow the law to adapt to the rapid
changes occurring in the telecommunications industry. Id. at 742-43. He applied "close[]
scrutin[y]," which required the government to prove it was addressing an "extremely
important problem, without imposing ... an unnecessarily great restriction on speech."
Id. at 743.
Five Justices of the Denver Court refused to endorse Justice Breyer's rejection of a
traditional standard of review; however, those justices were split as to just how to apply
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ban indecent programming on leased channels. 28 Nonetheless, the Court
struck down the third provision, allowing cable operators to ban indecent
programming on public access channels.'29 The Court also struck down
the second provision, dubbed the "segregate and block" provision.30 The
segregate and block provision required a cable operator, who chose not
to ban indecency on leased channels, to segregate indecent programs
onto one channel and block that channel from all subscribers.' 3  A
subscriber was required to make a written request to gain access to theS •132
segregated channel. The Court held that the segregate and block
provision abridged the First Amendment by allowing cable operators to
ban speech on the basis of content.33
More recently, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,3a the
Supreme Court struck down a provision of the Telecommunications Act
the traditional standards. Justice Kennedy and Justice Ginsburg applied strict scrutiny
and found that all three provisions violated the First Amendment. Id. at 781-83 (Kennedy,
J., concurring). In an opinion that would have upheld all three sections, Justice Thomas,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, approached the problem from a
different angle. Id. at 822 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas argued that Kennedy and the
plurality had erroneously focused on the programmer's free speech rights: "Turner
strongly suggests that the proper question is whether the leased and public access
requirements . . . are improper restrictions on the operators' free speech rights . . . the
constitutional presumption properly runs in favor of the operators' editorial discretion,
and that discretion may not be burdened without a compelling reason . I..." d
128. Id. at 733. After noting the government's compelling interest in protecting
children from harmful material, the plurality went on to uphold the provision for three
reasons: (1) cable television programs are just as pervasive and accessible to children as
the radio broadcasts in Pacifica; (2) the provision did not require that cable operators ban
indecent material on leased channels; and (3) the provision merely returned to cable
operators the discretion to ban indecent materials. Id. at 743-46.
129. Id. at 733. The plurality distinguished public access channels from leased
channels in striking down the public access channel provision. Id. at 760-64. The plurality
emphasized that cable operators "have not historically exercised editorial control" over
public access channels. Id. at 761. Therefore, this provision, unlike the leased channel
provision, "does not restore to cable operators editorial rights that they once had." Id.
Furthermore, the plurality argued that the provision was simply not necessary because
"the public/nonprofit programming control systems now in place would normally avoid,
minimize, or eliminate any child-related problems concerning 'patently offensive'
programming." Id. at 763-64.
130. Id. at 758, 760.
131. Id. at 735.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 760. The Court noted that the segregate and block provision, unlike the
other two provisions, required cable operators to block indecent speech. Id. at 753-54.
Furthermore, the plurality argued that section 504 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
offered a less restrictive method of safeguarding children. Id. at 756 (citing The
Communications Decency Act of 1996, § 504, 47 U.S.C. § 560 (1999)).
134. 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
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of 1996.' Section 505 of the act required cable operators to either limit
sexually explicit programming to late-night hours 36 or to "fully scramble
or otherwise fully block" those channels for all viewers not subscribed to
them. 3' The purpose of the provision was to protect children from the
possible harms of sexually explicit "signal bleed."'38
Section 505 failed the Court's strict scrutiny analysis. 39 Justice
Kennedy held that section 504 of the Telecommunications Act of 199614,
provided a less restrictive method of achieving the same purpose as
section 505.41 Justice Kennedy's opinion emphasized the principle that
the right of expression will trump content-based restrictions enacted to
protect the sensitivities of children.'42
D. Application of Obscenity and Indecency Standards to the Internet
1. The Communications Decency Act of 1996
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) was Congress' first
attempt to restrict obscene and indecent content on the Internet.143 The
135. See Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of t996, 47 U.S.C. § 561 (1994 &
Supp. 111997).
136. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 806 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 561(a) (1994 & Supp. 1II 1998))
(designating the hours between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. as the late-night hours).
137. 47 U.S.C. § 56 1(a) (1994 & Supp. Ill 1998).
138. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 806. Signal bleed, a result of imperfect scrambling by cable
operators, occurs when a cable television viewer is able to see or hear the partially
unscrambled signal of a channel to which he or she is not subscribed. Id.
139. Id. at 827. The Court held that since section 505 "is a content-based speech
restriction, it can stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny ... it must be narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling Government interest. If a less restrictive alternative would serve
the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative." Id. at 813 (citations
omitted).
140. 47 U.S.C. § 560 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997) (requiring a cable operator to "fully
scramble or otherwise fully block," free of charge, any channel a subscriber requests to be
blocked).
141. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 816. Justice Kennedy held that the government failed to
prove that section 504 would be ineffective at preventing children from viewing sexually
explicit signal bleed. Id. at 814.
142. Id. at 813. The Court stated that "[w]here the designed benefit of a content-based
speech restriction is to shield the sensibilities of listeners, the general rule is that the right
of expression prevails, even where no less restrictive alternative exists. We are expected
to protect our own sensibilities 'simply by averting [our] eyes."' Id. (citing Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
143. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(e) (1994). The CDA, enacted as Title V of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, was an attempt to update those portions of the
Communications Act of 1934 that were designed to regulate access to sexually explicit
telephone communications. See Wu, supra note 5, at 285 n.149. The CDA, by contrast,
applied to any "telecommunications device," including the Internet and electronic mail.
[Vol. 51:245
COPA and Community Standards on the Internet
CDA sought to protect children from accessing obscene or indecent
material on the Internet.' 44 The "indecent transmission" provision of the
CDA criminalized "the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent"
content to minors under eighteen years of age.145 The "patently offensive
display" provision criminalized "the knowing sending or displaying of
patently offensive messages in a manner that is available to a person
under 18 years of age.',
46
The CDA imposed fines and imprisonment of up to two years; 47 but,
the act also provided two affirmative defenses. 48  Under the CDA,
providers of obscene or indecent content, who took "good faith,
reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions" to restrict children from
accessing such content, would not be held criminally liable. 149 Similarly,
the CDA provided a defense for Internet content providers who
restricted, to adults only, access to their Web sites through proof of age
techniques, such as credit card verification or adult access codes.
50
2. Reno v. ACLU
On February 8, 1996,' 5' the ACLU filed suit in federal district court
challenging the constitutionality of the patently offensive display and
47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(A) (1994).
144. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502 (d)(1)(A)-(B),
110 Stat. 56 (1996). In proposing the amendment to the Telecommunications Act that
ultimately became the CDA, Senator James Exon stated that Congress should "make that
superhighway [the Internet] a safe place for our children and our families to travel on."
Wu, supra note 5, at 285 n.149 (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S8087-S8088 (daily ed. June 9,
1995) (statement of Sen. Exon)).
145. Reno 1, 521 U.S. 844, 859 (1997) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1994 & Supp. II
1997)).
146. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)).
147. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999) (declaring that violators "shall be
fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both").
148. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). The act provided in relevant part:
It is a defense to prosecution ... that a person -- (A) has taken, in good faith,
reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict
or prevent access by minors to a communication specified in such subsections,
which may involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from such
communications, including any method which is feasible under available
technology; or (B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring use
of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal
identification number.
47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
149. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
150. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(B) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
151. The same day the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was signed into law by
President Clinton. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 161 (1996).
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indecent transmission provisions of the CDA.'52  Following an
evidentiary hearing, a three-judge panel of the United States Districtn • • 153
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania unanimously granted a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of both provisions of the
CDA. 54  The United States Supreme Court, following the expedited-- 155
review process of the CDA, granted certiorari to review the district
court's decision.
156
In Reno v. ACLU (Reno I),"' the Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's decision, holding that both the patently offensive display
provision and the indecent transmission provision of the CDA violated
the First Amendment.15 Justice Stevens emphasized the overbreadth of
the two provisions of the CDA.'59 Justice Stevens wrote that in its
attempt to protect children, "the CDA effectively suppresses a large
amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to
address to one another.',
60
Additionally, Justice Stevens argued that the imprecise language in the
CDA provisions was unconstitutionally vague. 61 Justice Stevens'
majority opinion rejected the government's argument that the CDA was
152. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 827 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
153. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 861-62 & n.29 (1997).
154. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 851, 857.
155. Reno, 521 U.S. at 864.
156. Reno v. ACLU, 519 U.S. 1025 (1996).
157. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
158. Id. at 849. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 848. Justice O'Connor,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part. Id. at 886 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). It is
interesting to note that by writing the majority opinion and applying strict scrutiny analysis
to the CDA, Justice Stevens reversed his previous position in Pacifica that indecent speech
was a lesser-valued member of the protected speech club. Compare FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 725, 743 (1978) (arguing that indecent expression "surely lie[s] at the
periphery of First Amendment concern"), with Reno 1, 521 U.S. at 874-75 (arguing in favor
of a strict scrutiny analysis of the CDA).
159. Reno 1, 521 U.S. at 874.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 870-72. Justice Stevens noted the CDA's inconsistent use of language. Id.
at 870-71. The patently offensive display provision banned "indecent" content. Id. at 871
(citing 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1994 & Supp. 111997)). The indecent transmission provision,
on the other hand, banned material that was "patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards." Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1994 & Supp. II
1997)). Justice Stevens believed that this inconsistent language would cause confusion
among speakers. Id. Because the CDA imposed criminal penalties against violators,
Justice Stevens reasoned that such imprecise statutory language would have a chilling
effect on free speech. Id. at 871 -72.
[Vol. 51.:245
COPA and Community Standards on the Internet
no more vague than the obscenity standard established in Miller v.
California.62 The opinion pointed out that the CDA had only adopted
one of the three prongs necessary to the Miller obscenity test.163
Furthermore, the prong that the CDA did adopt, the patently offensive
prong, was incomplete because it did not include the requirement that
"the proscribed material be 'specifically defined by the applicable state
law."" According to the majority, this requirement would help
"reduce[] the vagueness inherent in the open-ended term 'patently




Justice Stevens applied strict scrutiny analysis to the CDA due to its
content-based restrictions on speech."' The majority found that the
burden on adult speech was unacceptable because less restrictive
alternatives existed and those alternatives would be just as effective at
protecting children as the CDA provisions.' 67  Furthermore, the Court
refused to defer to the "congressional judgment" that a total ban on
indecent speech was the least restrictive method to protect children on
the Internet.1
68
162. See id. at 872 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)). In the patently
offensive display provision of the CDA, Congress imported language directly from Miller.
Id. Compare Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (defining the obscenity test as determining "whether
'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the
work . . . depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law"), with 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. II 1997)
(prohibiting the use of any "interactive computer service" to display material that "depicts
or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs").
163. Reno 1, 521 U.S. at 873. Justice Stevens argued that adopting just one prong of
the three-prong Miller test was insufficient. Id. Justice Stevens explained that while the
word "trunk" may have several meanings standing alone (it could "refer to luggage, a
swimming suit, the base of a tree, or the long nose of an animal"), "its meaning is clear
when it is one prong of a three-part description of a species of gray animals." Id. at 873
n.38.
164. Id. at 873 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 24).
165. Id. at 871-72 (arguing that without such specificity, "the vagueness of such a
regulation" will have an "obvious chilling effect on free speech").
166. Id. at 874 (holding that the CDA "lacks the precision that the First Amendment
requires when a statute regulates the content of speech"). Justice Stevens noted several
possible alternatives to the CDA that provided less restrictive means at protecting
children. Id. at 879. He then concluded that in light of the CDA's "heavy burden on
protected speech," the statute's affirmative defenses did not "constitute the sort of
'narrow tailoring' that will save an otherwise patently invalid constitutional provision." Id.
at 882.
167. Id. at 874-75.
168. Id. at 875-76 (refusing to defer to "congressional judgment" without more).
"Sable thus made clear that the mere fact that a statutory regulation of speech was enacted
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The Reno I Court struck down the CDA provisions despite previous
Supreme Court decisions upholding governmental restrictions of
indecent speech for the purpose of protecting minors. 6 9 The government
cited three such cases in their argument in support of the CDA: Ginsberg
v. New York,""1 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,"' and Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc."' Nevertheless, Justice Stevens' majority opinion held that
its decision comported with those earlier cases, even though the ultimate
holdings were different. 73 Justice Stevens argued that the state statute at
issue in Ginsberg was both narrower in scope and less vague.174
Additionally, Justice Stevens argued that the FCC's declaratory order in
Pacifica was more narrowly tailored than the CDA's broad prohibition
of indecent or patently offensive material on the Internet.
17
1
Most notably, however, Justice Stevens distinguished Reno I from
Pacifica by distinguishing the Internet from broadcasting. 176  Justice
for the important purpose of protecting children from exposure to sexually explicit
material does not foreclose inquiry into its validity." Id. at 875 (citing Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129-30 (1989)). Justice Stevens made
clear that in enacting a statute to protect children from sexually explicit speech, Congress
must be certain that the statute is designed to affect that goal "without imposing an
unnecessarily great restriction on speech." Id. at 876 (quoting Denver Area Educ.
Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,741 (1996)).
169. See id. at 864-68.
170. 390 U.S. 629 (1968); see also supra Part I.A.3.
171. 438 U.S. 726 (1978); see also supra Part I.B. & !.C.1
1,72. 475 U.S. 41, 46-50 (1986) (holding that a zoning ordinance restricting the location
of adult movie theaters was a content neutral time, place, and manner regulation because
it was only concerned with the secondary effects that adult entertainment establishments
have on their community).
173. Reno 1, 521 U.S. 844, 864 (1997) (arguing that Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968), FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), and Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41 (1986) all support the Reno 1 Court's majority decision to strike down the
CDA as unconstitutional).
174. Id. at 865. Stevens argued that four conditions distinguished the statute upheld in
Ginsberg from the CDA. First, in Ginsberg, the right of parents to rear their children
without government interference was preserved by allowing the parent to buy adult
materials for their children if they so desired. Id. Whereas, under the CDA, a parent
could seemingly be found in violation for sending an email with indecent content to his or
her child. Id. at n.32. Second, the statute in Ginsberg only applied to commercial
transactions and provided a more specific definition of indecency. Id. Third, the New
York statute further required prohibited material to be found "utterly without redeeming
social importance for minors." Id. (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 646). Finally, the New
York statute defined a minor as under age seventeen as opposed to under age eighteen.
Id. at 863-66.
175. Id. at 867. The FCC order only applied to one specific broadcast and was not a
"broad categorical prohibition" like the CDA. Id. Additionally, the FCC order did not
impose criminal sanctions as did the CDA. Id.
176. Id. (noting that the Internet does not have a history of lesser First Amendment
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Stevens reasoned that the newborn Internet does not have a history of
lesser First Amendment protection as does radio and television.
177
According to Justice Stevens, the rationales that explain the lesser level
of protection for speech on radio and television do not apply to speech
on the Internet.178 The scarcity of available frequencies is the primary
rationale for the government's extensive regulation of radio and
television. 179 Scarcity, however, is not an issue on the Internet. 's0 The
Court noted that the Internet's "relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity
for communication" provides an accessible forum for anybody who cares
to use it."' Additionally, the Internet, unlike radio and television, does
not invade the home, snaring the unwary user and holding them a captive/. 182
audience. Justice Stevens cited the lower court's finding in Reno I that
"the risk of encountering indecent material [on the Internet] by accident
is remote because a series of affirmative steps is required to access
specific material."'83
Finally, the Reno I majority rejected the government's argument that
the CDA provisions were merely content-neutral time, place, and
manner restrictions akin to the municipal zoning ordinance upheld in
Renton." In rejecting the government's "cyberzoning" argument, Justice
Stevens found that the CDA's primary purpose, to protect children from
indecent and patently offensive speech, was content-based and could not





protection as does radio and television broadcasting).
177. Id.
178. Id. (noting that the Internet required "a series of affirmative steps ... to access
specific material").
179. Id. at 868 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1994);
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 399-400 (1969)); see also supra Part I.C.1.
180. Id. at 868.
181. Id. at 870. At the time of this case, the government estimated that approximately
forty million people worldwide used the Internet. Id. Today, that figure has grown to
more than 459 million. World Wide Adoption of Internet, supra note 6.
182. Id. at 867-69. "Communications over the Internet do not 'invade' an individual's
home or appear on one's computer screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter content 'by
accident."' Id. at 869 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
183. Id. at 867.
184. Id. at 867-68 (rejecting the government's argument that the CDA was merely a
form of "cyberzoning" because the CDA, unlike a narrow time, place, and manner
regulation, "applies broadly to the entire universe of cyberspace").
185. Id. at 868 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 46 (1986)). The
Renton ordinance restricted the zoning of adult movie theaters to distance them from
residential neighborhoods. Renton, 475 U.S. at 44. In Reno I, Justice Stevens emphasized
that the Renton ordinance was a content-neutral regulation, and thus the Court applied
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After dispensing with the government's line of cases, the Reno I Court
searched for case law dealing with subject matter analogous to the
Internet. The majority found Sable Communications of California, Inc.
v. FCC'86 to be the most analogous precedent to apply in Reno . In
striking down a statute prohibiting indecent interstate commercial
telephone messages, the Sable Court distinguished telephony from
broadcasting.8 8 The Reno I majority compared logging onto an Internet
pornography site to placing a telephone call to a dial-a-porn hotline; both
require affirmative steps by the user to receive the offensive content.'8 9
Concluding that the CDA's heavy burden on free speech and
expression was not narrowly tailored, the Reno I Court struck down the
CDA as facially unconstitutional." Referring to the Sable Court's
admonition not to "burn[] the house to roast the pig,"'' the Reno I Court
remarked that the CDA "threaten[ed] to torch a large segment of the
Internet community."' 92 The Supreme Court's decision in Reno I made
intermediate scrutiny. Reno 1, 521 U.S. at 867. The zoning ordinance in Renton was
aimed at controlling the "secondary effects" adult movie theaters have on their
community, not at controlling the content of speech within those theaters. Renton, 475
U.S. at 48-49. The "secondary effects" the Court referred to included increased crime
rates, decreased retail trade, decreased property values, and a decrease in the overall
"quality of urban life." Id. at 48. Since the Renton ordinance was only aimed at
controlling the incidental effects that speech had on its community, and was not concerned
with the content of the speech itself, the Renton Court found the ordinance to be content-
neutral. Id. The purpose of the CDA, however, was to "protect children from the primary
effects of 'indecent' and 'patently offensive' speech, rather than any 'secondary' effect of
such speech." Reno 1, 521 U.S. at 868.
186. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
187. Reno 1, 521 U.S. at 869-70. The Reno Court held that the district court had been
"correct to conclude that the CDA effectively resembles the ban on 'dial-a-porn'
invalidated in Sable." Id. at 875 (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 129).
188. Id. at 869-70 (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 128) (distinguishing dial-a-porn telephone
services from radio broadcasts, public displays, and unsolicited mailings)). The Sable
Court argued that there cannot be a "captive audience" in the context of the dial-it
medium. Sable, 492 U.S. at 128. Contrasting the dial-it medium from broadcasting, the
Court noted that "[u]nlike an unexpected outburst on a radio broadcast, the message
received by one who places a call to a dial-a-porn service is not so invasive or surprising
that it prevents an unwilling listener from avoiding exposure to it." Id.
189. Reno 1, 521 U.S. at 870 ("Placing a telephone call.., is not the same as turning on
a radio and being taken by surprise by an indecent message.") (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at
128).
190. Id. at 882 (labeling the CDA a "patently invalid unconstitutional provision").
191. Id. (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 127).
192. Id. The Reno I Court also considered the possibility that the strictest
communities would be empowered to govern all content on the Internet. Id. at 877-78.
According to the Court, "the 'community standards' criterion as applied to the Internet
means that any communication available to a nationwide audience will be judged by the
standards of the community most likely to be offended by the message." Id.
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clear that statutes attempting to regulate content on the Internet would
be subject to the highest level of scrutiny.'9
3. State Efforts to Protect Children Online
Several states have passed laws modeled after the CDA. 94 New York
enacted a statute that prohibited the use of "any computer
communication system" to make available data that is "harmful to
minors."'95 The New York law imported much of the language from the
Miller test into its definition of "harmful to minors."' 96 The American
Libraries Association challenged the statute as an unconstitutional
violation of both the First Amendment and the Commerce Clause.1 97
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
enjoined enforcement of the statute on the grounds that it violated the
Commerce Clause, but refrained from issuing a holding on the First
Amendment issues. 98 The district court, did not, however, enjoin
193. Id. at 879; see also Kelly M. Doherty, WWW.Obscenity.com: An Analysis of
Obscenity and Indecency Regulation on the Internet, 32 AKRON L. REv. 259, 277-78 (1999)
(arguing that COPA is unconstitutional because its restrictions are not tailored narrowly
enough to meet the high standard of strict scrutiny).
194. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2 (Michie 1998); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21
(McKinney 2000).
195. The New York statute provided in relevant part:
Knowing the character and content of the communication which, in whole or in
part, depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic
abuse, and which is harmful to minors, [to] intentionally use[] any computer
communication system allowing the input, output, examination or transfer, of
computer data or computer programs from one computer to another, to initiate
or engage in such communication with a person who is a minor.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21(3) (McKinney 2000).
196. The New York statute defined "harmful to minors" as:
[T]hat quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity,
sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse, when it: (a)
Considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors; and (b)
Is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole
with respect to what is suitable material for minors; and (c) Considered as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political and scientific value for minors.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20(6) (McKinney 2000).
197. Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
198. Id. at 183-84. The district court found that the statute violated the "dormant"
Commerce Clause, a reading of the Commerce Clause that "restricts the individual states'
interference with the flow of interstate commerce ..... Id. at 169. The district court gave
three reasons for its decision: (1) "the Act represents an unconstitutional projection of
New York law into conduct that occurs wholly outside New York"; (2) "the burdens on
interstate commerce resulting from the Act clearly exceed any local benefit derived from
it"; and (3) "the Internet is one of those areas of commerce that must be marked off as a
national preserve to protect users from inconsistent legislation that, taken to its most
extreme, could paralyze development of the Internet altogether." Id.
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enforcement of a similar provision that targets sexual predators of
children.' 99
New Mexico also adopted a statute substantially similar to the CDA .
The American Civil Liberties Union challenged the New Mexico statute
as violating the First Amendment and the Commerce Clause.20 ' As in
New York, the United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the
statute. 02 This time, however, the district court held that the plaintiffs
were likely to succeed on the merits of both their First Amendment and
Commerce Clause claims. 3 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
preliminary injunction on both grounds."4 More recently, two other
CDA modeled state statutes met similar fates in Michigan and
201Virginia.
199. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.22 (McKinney 2000). This provision, like section 235.21,
prohibits the dissemination of material harmful to minors through the use of a computer
communication system. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21 (McKinney 2000), with N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 235.22(1) (McKinney 2000). Section 235.22, however, also requires that the
offender "invite[ I or induce[ ] a minor to engage in sexual intercourse, deviate sexual
intercourse, or sexual contact with him .... N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.22(2) (McKinney
2000). Section 235.21 was only a second degree crime, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21
(McKinney 2000), whereas section 235.22 is a first degree offense. N.Y. PENAL LAW §
235.22 (McKinney 2000).
200. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2(A) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2001). The New Mexico
statute outlawed:
Dissemination of material that is harmful to a minor by computer consists of the
use of a computer communications system that allows the input, output,
examination or transfer of computer data or computer programs from one
computer to another, to knowingly and intentionally initiate or engage in
communication with a person under eighteen years of age when such
communication in whole or in part depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual
intercourse or any other sexual conduct.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2(A) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2001).
201. ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1152 (10th Cir. 1999).
202. ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034 (D.N.M. 1998), affd, 194 F.3d 1149
(10th Cir. 1999).
203. Id. at 1033-34.
204. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1152. Just as the Supreme Court ruled in Reno I, the Tenth
Circuit found that the New Mexico statute "unconstitutionally burdens otherwise
protected adult communication on the Internet." Id. at 1160. Despite New Mexico's
attempts to distinguish their statute from the CDA, the Tenth Circuit held that "the
essence of the Supreme Court's rationale [in Reno f], and the similarities between the two
statutes, do compel the same result." Id. at 1158.
205. Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 142 F. Supp. 2d 827, 829 (E.D. Mich.
2001) (granting summary judgment for the plaintiff and permanently enjoining
enforcement of a Michigan statute prohibiting the use of the Internet to display or
disseminate to minors material that is harmful to minors); PSINET, Inc. v. Chapman, 108
F. Supp. 2d 611, 613-17 (W.D. Va. 2000) (granting a preliminary injunction against
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4. Filtering Technology
In the wake of the CDA's failure and the failure of several similar state
statutes, parents and lawmakers have turned to technology for an
answer.2°6 Filtering software exists that allows parents to control what
Web sites their children can access when they are online.0 7  Such
enforcement of a Virginia statute making it illegal to display or disseminate to juveniles
electronic files containing material that is harmful to juveniles).
206. Digital Chaperones For Kids: Which Internet Filters Protect the Best? Which Get
in the Way?, CONSUMER REPORTS ONLINE (Mar. 2001), at
http://www.consumerreports.org/main/detail.jsp?CONTENT%3C%3Ecntid=18867&FO
LDER%3C%3Efolderid=18151&bmUID=1005947602876 (stating that in light of
Congress' failures, parents are left with the ultimate responsibility for protecting their
children from harmful content on the Internet)-
207. Digital Chaperones, supra note 206 (noting that the number of software filters on
the market has grown from "a handful to well over a dozen" since 1997); Ratings: Filtering
Software, CONSUMER REPORTS ONLINE (Mar. 2001), at
http://www.consumerreports.org/main/detail.jspCONTENT%3C%3Ecntid=18871&FO
LDER%3C%3Efolderid=18151&bmUID=1005947616750 (listing the leading
commercial software filters and rating them on their ability to filter harmful Web sites
versus how often they block legitimate Web sites); see also Net Nanny 4, Net Nanny 4:
Product Description (Nov. 16, 2001), at http://www.netnanny.com/home/
net nanny_4/product-description.asp (advertising the ability to "[f]ilter out the negative
sites or only allow access to the positive sites"); Cyber Patrol for Home, Cyber Patrol for
Home for Individual PC or Macintosh (Nov. 16, 2001), at
http://www.surfcontrol.com/products/cyberpatrol-for home/productoverview/index.html
(providing customers with the ability to customize their software so that each member of a
family can have different levels of filtering).
Consumer Reports also rated an online filtering service provided by America Online.
Ratings: Filtering Software, supra. Subscribers of America Online do not need to buy their
own stand-alone filters. Id. America Online provides one of the most efficient filters on
the market and its price is included in the regular subscription charge. Id.; see also Digital
Chaperones, supra note 206.
Consumer Reports provided a description of how filters operate. Digital Chaperones,
supra note 206. Filters essentially work as a gateway between a computer's Web browser
and the Internet connection. Id. The theory is that the filter will open the gate for
legitimate content but will close it when the user attempts to connect to an objectionable
Web site. Id.
There are three methods for determining when the gate should close. Id. One method,
software analysis, enables the software itself to determine whether a given Web site is
objectionable. Id. Certain images or phrases embedded within a Web site will trigger the
software to block the site. Id. Software filters are the most prone to mistakenly blocking
legitimate Web sites because a single prohibited word taken out of context may activate
the filter. Id. Human analysis, where a filtering company's staff manually searches for
objectionable sites on the Web in order to create a list of banned sites, is more accurate
but is also prone to missing many offensive sites given the dynamic nature of the Web. Id.
A third method is Web site labeling. Id. Under this approach Web publishers voluntarily
rate the content on their Web sites and a user's browser filters sites according to these
labels. Id. This approach, however, relies on the honesty of the Web publishers to
voluntarily and objectively rate their own content. Id. This labeling approach has been
sharply criticized by Lawrence Lessig. Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech:
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technology can also be used to track the Web sites, newsgroups, and chat
rooms their children visit. Most private filtering software packages cost
between forty and eighty dollars and are usually purchased on a
subscription basis, because the software has to be updated periodically.00
Nevertheless, filtering technology has been criticized for being both
under and over inclusive t  Filters often fail to block a certain
percentage of objectionable Web sites. Those same filters also
sometimes block Web sites that contain legitimate material, such as Web




Despite the imperfections of software filters, local governments and
federal lawmakers have urged the use of filters in public schools and
libraries.21 A Virginia public library's policy to restrict the Internet
access of its patrons was the first Internet filter case to catch the attention
of free speech advocates.2 " The Board of Trustees of the Loudoun
CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering, at 38-47 (May 12, 1998), at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/works/lessig/what-things.pdf; see also LESSIG, supra note 2 at
177-82 (arguing against the adoption of the Platform for Internet Content Selection
(PICS)).
208. Ratings: Filtering Software, supra note 207 (noting that Cyber Patrol, Cybersitter,
Cyber Snoop, and Net Nanny have the ability to log online activity); see also Net Nanny,
supra note 207 (advertising an ability to "[t]rack your family's online activities").
209. Ratings: Filtering Software, supra note 207; see also, e.g., Cyber Patrol, supra note
207.
210. Lessig, supra note 207, at 33-35 (arguing that blocking technology is crude, overly
broad, and susceptible to the subjective judgments of those who design the filter).
211. Digital Chaperones, supra note 206. Consumer Reports tested six stand-alone
software filtering programs and also tested America Online's filtering controls. Id. Using
each filter's settings for children ages thirteen to fifteen, Consumer Reports attempted to
access eighty-six Web sites containing sexually explicit content, violent content, or
promoting drugs, tobacco, crime, or bigotry. Id. America Online's "Young Teen" setting
performed the best, allowing uncensored access to only one such Web site. Id. The other
filters, however, all failed to block 20 percent or more of the offensive Web sites. Id.
212. Id. ("In some cases, filters block harmless sites merely because their software
does not consider the context in which a word or phrase is used. Far more troubling is
when a filter appears to block legitimate sites based on moral or political value
judgments."). Consumer Reports, again calibrating the filters to block material
inappropriate for thirteen to fifteen year-old children, attempted to access fifty-three Web
sites "that featured serious content on controversial subjects." Id. This time, America
Online's Young Teen filter was the worst offender, blocking sixty-three percent of the
sites. Id. Most filters, however, "blocked only a few sites." Id.
Consumer Reports concluded that filtering software was "no substitute for parental
supervision. Most of the products we tested failed to block one objectionable site in five.
America Online's Young Teen ... setting provides the best protection, though it will likely
curb access to Web sites addressing political and social issues." Id.
213. See, e.g., Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Loudoun County Library, 24
F. Supp. 2d 552, 556 (E.D. Va. 1998).
214. Id. at 556.
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County Library passed a "Policy on Internet Sexual Harassment" that
included the installation of software filters on all library computers to
block access to Web sites displaying obscene material or any other
material "deemed harmful to juveniles." 2"5 Mainstream Loudoun, a
Loudoun County non-profit organization, and several local residents
sued the library contending that the Internet policy violated the FirstA . .216
Amendment. In Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the
Loudoun County Library, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia granted the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment and permanently enjoined the library from enforcing the
Internet filtering policy.
211
Undeterred by the result in Mainstream Loudoun, Congress passed its
own Internet filtering law in late 2000: the Children's Internet Protection
Act (CHIPA).2 8 CHIPA mandates that public schools and libraries that
receive federal funds must install filtering software on computers used by
patrons who are younger than eighteen.2" The public schools and
libraries are given discretion to determine what kind of filtering software
to install, but the filters must be targeted to block material that is
obscene or meets the definition of being harmful to minors.22 ° Schools
and libraries that decide to opt-out of CHIPA's filtering requirement
lose their eligibility to receive federally mandated discounts from
215. Id.
216. Id. at 552, 556-57.
217. Id. at 570. The district court found that the Internet policy was a content-based
regulation of speech and therefore applied a strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at 563. The court
concluded the policy failed strict scrutiny review because it was not narrowly tailored to
further a compelling governmental interest. Id. at 570.
218. The Children's Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763,
2763A-343 to 2763A-350 (2000) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000)).
219. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(B) (2000) (requiring public schools to employ the
"operation of a technology protection measure with respect to any of its computers with
Internet access"); Id. § 254(h)(6)(B) (2000) (requiring the same technological measures
for libraries).
220. Id. § 254(h)(5) (2000) (laying out the certification requirements for schools); Id. §
254(h)(6) (2000) (laying out the certification requirements for libraries).
CHIPA defines harmful to minors as:
[Alny picture, image, graphic image file, or other visual depiction that -- (i) taken
as a whole and with respect to minors, appeals to the prurient interest in nudity,
sex, or excretion; (ii) depicts, describes, or represents, in a patently offensive way
with respect to what is suitable for minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or
sexual contact, actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual acts, or a lewd
exhibition of the genitals; and (iii) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value as to minors.
47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(G) (2000).
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211
telecommunication service providers.
Not surprisingly, a combination of libraries, free speech organizations,
Internet Web providers, and individuals filed two lawsuits challenging
the constitutionality of CHIPA. Following the CDA review process,
the two lawsuits were assigned to a special three-judge panel in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.2 23 The three-judge panel denied the
government's motion to dismiss the two cases and the panel is scheduled
to hear the cases in early 2002.224 Any appeal of the panel's decision
25
would go directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.
E. Back to the Drawing Board: The Child Online Protection Act of 1998
1. The Child Online Protection Act of 1998
The Child Online Protection Act of 1998226 (COPA) is essentially a
221
revision of the CDA. With Reno I in mind, Congress tried again to
enact a statute that would restrict minors from accessing harmful
materials on the Word Wide Web.228 COPA criminalizes the commercial
221. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(F); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(F).
222. Shannon P. Duffy, Libraries, ACLU Challenge New Law: It's the Third Suit
Against Laws Meant to Protect Children From Internet Pornography, 224 THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER I (Mar. 21, 2001). One suit was filed by the American Library
Association along with the American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania. Id. The
other suit was filed by the Multnomah County Public Library and a coalition of libraries,
library associations, individual library patrons, and Internet publishers. Id.
223. Am. Library Assoc. v. United States, No. 01-1303 (E.D. Pa. July 2001) (denying
motion to dismiss); Multnomah County Pub. Library v. United States, No. 01-1322 (E.D.
Pa. July 2001) (denying motion to dismiss); see also Lawsuits Challenging Requirement For
Library Internet Filtering Can Proceed, 2 No. II ANDREWS E-Bus. L. BULL. 3 (Sept.
2001).
224. Am. Library Assoc. v. United States, No. 01-1303 (E.D. Pa. July 2001) (denying
motion to dismiss); Multnomah County Pub. Library v. United States, No. 01- 1322 (E.D.
Pa. July 2001) (denying motion to dismiss), available at http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/
documents/3jic/ORDER2.HTM; Lawsuits Challenging Requirement, supra note 223.
225. Lawsuits Challenging Requirement, supra note 223.
226. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-736 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998)). The
Act was signed into law by President Clinton on October 21, 1998. Doherty, supra note
193, at 280 & n.158 (citing David Walsh, World Socialist Website, U.S. Group Sties Over
Attempt at Internet Censorship, http://www.wsws.org/news/1998/octl998/netO24.html (last
visited Nov. 1, 1998); Frank James, Internet Anti-Smut Law Challenged as
Unconstitutional, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 23, 1998, at 3 (suggesting that President Clinton was
pressured into signing COPA, despite reservations about its constitutionality, in order to
distance himself from the Monica Lewinsky scandal and to allow the White House to
"regain its moral compass")).
227. Congress enacted COPA as an amendment to section 223 of the Communications
Act of 1934. See H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 1, 5 (1998).
228. Congress indicated that:
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use of the World Wide Web to transmit material that may be harmful
and accessible to minors." 9  In defining material that is "harmful to
minors," COPA largely imported the standards laid down in Miller and
Ginsberg:
23°
The term "material that is harmful to minors" means any
communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article,
recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene
or that -
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would find, taking the material as a whole and with
respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to
pander to, the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently
offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual
act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or
perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or
post-pubescent female breast; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value for minors.3
COPA, like the CDA before it, provides affirmative defenses to
The purpose of H.R. 3783 [COPA] is to amend the Communications Act of 1934
by prohibiting the sale of pornographic materials on the World Wide Web (or
the Web) to minors. H.R. 3783 has been carefully drafted to respond to the
Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. ACLU... and the Committee believes that
the bill strikes the appropriate balance between preserving the First Amendment
rights of adults and protecting children from harmful material on the World
Wide Web.
H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 1 (1998).
229. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 2000) provides:
Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the material, in
interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web, makes any
communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that
includes any material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more than
$50,000, imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both.
A "minor" is defined as any person under seventeen years of age. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(7)
(1994 & Supp. V 2000). A person is considered "engaged in the business" if the posting on
the Web of material harmful to minors is "a regular course of such person's trade or
business, with the objective of earning a profit." 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(B) (1994 & Supp.
V 2000). Additionally, intentional violators are subjected to a fifty thousand dollar fine
for each violation, and each day of a violation constitutes a separate violation. 47 U.S.C. §
231(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
230. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-775, at 27-28 (1998). "The Committee intends for the
definition of material harmful to minors to parallel the Ginsberg and Miller definitions of
obscenity and harmful to minors .... In essence, the Committee intends to adopt the
'variable obscenity' standard for minors." Id.
231. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
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defendants who, in good faith, attempt to bar minors from access to their
sexually explicit material through one of the following three methods: (1)
requiring a credit card or adult personal identification number; (2) age
212verification; or (3) other technological measures.
2. A CL U v. Reno
The day after COPA was signed into law, the ACLU and several other
interested parties233 filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
seeking to enjoin its enforcement.2 4 The ACLU challenged COPA on
three grounds: (1) that its facial and as-applied prohibition of protected
speech is a violation of the First Amendment; (2) that it is facially
unconstitutional for abridging the First Amendment rights of minors; and
(3) that it is void for vagueness under the First and Fifth Amendments.
235
Following a hearing on November 19, 1998, the district court entered a
temporary restraining order, enjoining enforcement of COPA from
November 20, 1998, to December 4, 1998.236 On February 1, 1999, the
district court denied the government's motion to dismiss and granted
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of
COPA.237
The government appealed the district court's decision to the United
238States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In ACLU v. Reno (Reno
1,), 219 the Third Circuit held that the ACLU's constitutional challenge of
232. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (c)(1)(A)-(C) (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
233. Seventeen plaintiffs filed suit in ACLU v. Reno: American Civil Liberties Union
(on behalf of all its members); A Different Light Bookstore; American Booksellers
Foundation for Free Expression; ArtNet; The Blackstripe; Condomania; Electronic
Frontier Foundation (on behalf of all its members); Electronic Privacy Information
Center; Free Speech Media, LLC; Internet Content Coalition; OBGYN.NET;
Philadelphia Gay News; PlanetOut Corporation; Powell's Bookstore; RIOTGRRL; Salon
Magazine; and Westock.com. ACLU v. Reno II Victory! Appeals Court Rejects Congress'
Second Attempt at Cyber-Censorship (June 22, 2000), available at http://www.aclu.org/
news/2000/n062200b.html.
234. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1999), affd, ACLU v. Reno,
217 F.3d 162 (3d. Cir. 2000).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 499. The district court applied strict scrutiny to COPA based on the finding
that the statute was a content-based restriction of non-obscene sexual expression. Id. at
492-93. The Court further found that plaintiffs had established a "likelihood of success on
the merits," irreparable harm from enforcement of the statute, and that the balance of
interests weighed in their favor. Id. at 498.
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COPA was likely to succeed on the merits, and therefore affirmed the
district court's grant of a preliminary injunction.240
The Third Circuit agreed with the district court that COPA is a
content-based restriction of free speech, and therefore is "both
presumptively invalid and subject to strict scrutiny analysis., 241  The
Third Circuit focused its opinion on COPA's reliance of the
contemporary community standards test to determine the lawfulness of
242
content on the World Wide Web.
In analyzing the application of the contemporary community standard
test to the Internet, the Third Circuit first noted that the Internet is a
borderless medium that is not geographically constrained like other
traditional mediums.2 43  Every Web site has the potential to reach a
world-wide audience.2 44  The Third Circuit further noted the district
court's finding that "Web publishers cannot 'prevent [their site's] content
from entering any geographic community.' 245  In other words, Web
publishers cannot tailor their message to reach only those communities
that would approve of the message; all Internet users world-wide have
access to any given Web site.246
The Third Circuit reasoned, therefore, that a Web publisher
endeavoring to stay within the law is forced to "abide by the most
restrictive and conservative state's community standards in order to
avoid criminal liability., 247  The Third Circuit argued that tailoring
content to conform to the strictest community's standard imposed an
impermissible burden on free speech.24" This approach would force Web
publishers to either censor their content to conform to the strictest
community standard, or install a credit card or age verification system to
employ COPA's affirmative defenses.149 The Third Circuit found that
240. Id. at 166.
241. Id. at 173 (quoting Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 493). Thus, the Third Circuit analyzed
COPA to determine whether it is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest,
and that it achieves that interest through the least restrictive means. Id.
242. Id. at 173-74 ("We are not persuaded that the Supreme Court's concern with
respect to the 'community standards' criterion has been sufficiently remedied by Congress
in COPA."); see also Reno 1, 521 U.S. 844, 877-78 (1997).
243. Reno 11, 217 F.3d at 168-69.
244. Id. at 169.
245. Id. (citing Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 484) (finding that Web publishers have no
control over which Internet users may access their site, and therefore have no way to block
access based on geographic community).
246. Id.; see also Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
247. Reno 1H, 217 F.3d at 166.
248. Id.
249. See 47 U.S.C. § 231(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999); see also Reno 11, 217 F.3d at 175.
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credit card and age verification systems could be costly for Web
publishers to install and maintain.5 0  More importantly, such systems
have a tendency to deter potential patrons, resulting in a loss in traffic,
and therefore a loss in potential revenue for the Web publishers."'
Finally, those Web publishers who choose to censor their message
rather than install a costly age verification system, would deprive adult
Internet users of their First Amendment right to access the uncensored
252materials. Thus, the Third Circuit found that COPA results in an
"overreaching burden and restriction on constitutionally protected
speech." 253
The Third Circuit, however, emphasized the narrowness of its holding;
254the court made clear that it was not challenging the Miller test. The
Third Circuit believed the community standards test in Miller would
continue "to be a useful and viable tool in contexts other than the
Internet and the Web under present technology., 255  According to the
Third Circuit, the Miller test, which was created to review a state statute
banning the distribution of sexually explicit materials through the mail,
216
does not apply to the Internet. The defendants in Miller could control
where they mailed their sexually explicit material, whereas a Web
publisher does not have such control. 25' Nevertheless, the Third Circuit
theorized that advances in new technology (i.e., technology that would
allow Web publishers to control where their information was
disseminated) could make the application of community standards to the
250. Reno II, 217 F.3d at 171 (acknowledging that the age verification systems are
likely to be less costly than the credit card verification systems). Citing to the district
court's findings, the Third Circuit noted that Web publishers could hire a company
specializing in adult verification services for a percentage of the fees generated by visitors
to the Web site. Id. at 170-71.
251. Id. at 171. Both types of verification systems typically require Web site visitors to
reveal personal information, including credit card numbers. Id. These type of invasive
questions dissuade people who might otherwise access the site. See id.
252. Id. at 177.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 180 ("Our holding in no way ignores or questions the general applicability
of the holding in Miller with respect to 'contemporary community standards."').
255. Id.
256. Id. ("Miller, however, has no applicability to the Internet and the Web, where
Web publishers are currently without the ability to control the geographic scope of the
recipients of their communications.").
257. Id. Compare id. (finding that Web publishers cannot control where their
communications are received), with Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (creating
the contemporary community standards test to restrict the mailing of unsolicited sexually
explicit material where the sender can control the destination of the material).
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Internet constitutional.258
II. AN ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY STANDARDS AS
APPLIED TO THE INTERNET: APPROACHES IN LIGHT OF VARIOUS
CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS
A. The Community Standards Test Cannot Apply to the Internet
Even prior to its application to the Internet, the contemporary
community standards test did not enjoy universal acceptance.259 In Roth,
the first case to enunciate a community standards approach for
measuring obscenity, Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, voiced a
vigorous dissent.260 Believing that such a standard was repugnant to the
First Amendment's protection of free speech, Justice Douglas wrote:
"Any test that turns on what is offensive to the community's standards is
too loose, too capricious, too destructive of freedom of expression to be
squared with the First Amendment., 261  Justice Douglas found the
community standards test troubling because it allowed juries to censor
262protected speech for their own personal and subjective reasons.
1. No Geographic Internet Community Exists
Several commentators have argued that the rationale behind the Miller
test does not apply to the Internet.26 1 One reason for measuring
258. Reno II, 217 F.3d at 181 ("We also express our confidence and firm conviction
that developing technology will soon render the 'community standards' challenge moot,
thereby making congressional regulation to protect minors from harmful material on the
Web constitutionally practicable.").
259. Miller, 413 U.S. at 39-40 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the First
Amendment protects obscene speech and that the Miller test is vague); Paris Adult
Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 109-113 (1973) (Brennan, J., Stewart, J., and Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing against the application of any obscenity test because the "First and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting
wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 511-
12 (1957) (Douglas, J., and Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the community standards
test "conflicts... with the command of the First Amendment").
260. Roth, 354 U.S. at 508-14 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 512.
262. Id. ("Under this test, juries can censor, suppress, and punish what they don't like,
provided the matter relates to 'sexual impurity' or has a tendency to 'excite lustful
thoughts.' This is community censorship in one of its worst forms."). Justice Douglas took
a hands-off approach to speech. He argued that the government could only regulate
antisocial conduct, not speech. Id. at 512-13. To do otherwise would allow the censor to
suppress speech on the basis of his or her own moral code. Id. at 513.
263. See, e.g., Doherty, supra note 193, at 286-89 (arguing that since the community
standards test "can produce different results based on the location of the receiver,
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obscenity with local community standards is to give the "people [of a
community] ... some control over the type of establishments that may
operate in their neighborhood. 264 This rationale does not ring true for
265the Internet. While some commentators argue that there is a "cyber
community" or a "virtual community,, 26 these phrases ring hollow in the
absence of a true geographic community on the Internet.
67
COPA, like the Miller test before it, applies the community standard
of the receiver for determining whether material is harmful to minors.266
The Miller test contradicts itself, however, when applied to Internet
communications. The Supreme Court in Miller explicitly rejected the
261idea that juries should apply a national community standard. Writing
reasonable users will be unable to predict what is deemed harmful to minors"); Jill
Jacobson, The Child Online Protection Act: Congress's Latest Attempt to Regulate Speech
on the Internet, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 221, 249-50 (1999) (arguing that the community
standards test is overly burdensome to Web posters because it is "impossible for an online
content provider to ascertain the standards of each community that could potentially
access its material"); Philip E. Lewis, A Brief Comment on the Application of the
"Contemporary Community Standard" to the Internet, 22 CAMPBELL L. REV. 143, 158-61
(1999) (arguing that the original rationale for the contemporary community standards test,
to give people of a geographic community some control over what type of businesses may
operate in their community, does not apply to the Internet); Heather L. Miller, Strike
Two: An Analysis of the Child Online Protection Act's Constitutional Failures, 52 FED.
COMM. L.J. 155, 174-75 (1999) (arguing that an application of the community standards
test that applies the community standards of the receiver is problematic because, unlike
other communication media, the Web poster has no control over where his or her
transmission is received).
264. Lewis, supra note 263, at 160.
265. Id. at 158-61
266. Developments - The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1577, t598-99 (1999)
(advocating the creation of a virtual community standard based on specific, discrete
Internet communities); Wu, supra note 5, at 302 (proposing the formation of an
international executive board to create a workable virtual community standard for the
Internet).
267. See Donald T. Stepka, Obscenity On-line: A Transactional Approach to
Computer Transfers of Potentially Obscene Material, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 935-36
(1997) (arguing against adoption of a virtual or "cyber-community" standard).
268. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999); Reno II, 217 F.3d 162, 167-68 (3d
Cir. 2000); see also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105 (1974) (holding that it was
appropriate for jurors in an obscenity case, brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1461, to draw from
the community standards existing in the Southern District of California (the standard of
the community where the case was being tried)); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31, 33-34
(1973) (instructing juries in an obscenity case to apply the community standards of the
geographic locale where the sexually explicit materials were received).
269. Miller, 413 U.S. at 31-32 ("Nothing in the First Amendment requires that a jury
must consider hypothetical and unascertainable 'national standards' when attempting to
determine whether certain materials are obscene as a matter of fact."); Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that there is "no provable
'national standard.' nor should there be one).
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for the majority, Chief Justice Burger argued it was "neither realistic nor
constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the
people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found
tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City."27 Rather, the Miller Court
endorsed the use of a local community standard test.27l The problem
with applying the Miller test to Internet communications is that although
the jury is instructed to apply their own local standard, that standard will
become a de facto international standard. Since the Internet is a global
medium, the local community standard used to determine whether
content is harmful to minors will govern world-wide communications.
The result is an international, not merely a local, community standard
determining content that is appropriate on the Internet.2 Thus, the
people of Maine and Mississippi could control the content in Las Vegas
and New York City.
Indeed, a community's standard could reach farther than any one
particular case. Since the Supreme Court has mandated the use of a local
community standard when confronting obscenity and harmful to minor
statutes, a publisher of sexually explicit materials may find himself
prosecuted in any community that is touched by his materials.74 When
someone posts material on the World Wide Web it can be received in
270. Miller, 413 U.S. at 32. "People in different States vary in their tastes and
attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed
uniformity." Id. at 33.
271. Id. at 31-32; see also Hamling, 418 U.S. at 104-05 (holding that a juror in an
obscenity case is permitted to "draw on knowledge of the community or vicinage from
which he comes in deciding what conclusion 'the average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would reach in a given case"). But see Jennifer A. Rupert, Tangled
in the Web: Federal and State Efforts to Protect Children From Internet Pornography, 11
Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 130, 135-36 (1999) (explaining that while the Miller definition
allows the jury to apply community standards to determine "prurient interest" and "patent
offensiveness," the definition calls for a national standard to determine whether the
material has "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value") (citing Miller, 413 U.S.
at 24, 37).
272. Reno II, 217 F.3d at 177 (noting that since Web publishers cannot control where
their communication is received, "such publishers would necessarily be compelled to abide
by the 'standards of the community most likely to be offended by the message"') (citing
Reno 1, 521 U.S. 844, 877-78 (1997)).
273. Id.
274. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 106 (holding that the "community" implicated in a federal
obscenity case is the judicial district where the case is tried); United States v. Thomas, 74
F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that since sexually explicit "computer-generated
images ...were electronically transferred" from California to the Western District of
Tennessee, the jury should apply the community standards of the Western District of
Tennessee); United States v. Peraino, 645 F.2d 548, 551 (6th Cir. 1981) (noting that
"[v]enue for federal obscenity prosecutions lies 'in any district from, through, or into
which' the allegedly obscene material moves") (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3237).
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almost any community around the world."' Furthermore, the Web
publisher has no control over who will view that material. Therefore,
Web publishers of any kind of sexual material risk liability in any
community that has access to the Internet. Consequently, Web content is• 277
governed by the strictest possible community. As noted earlier, both
the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit have warned against this lowest
common denominator outcome. 278  Furthermore, such an outcome is
contrary to the very rationale behind the Miller Court's adoption of a
local community standard test: to allow the average person, not the most
279pious nor the most tolerant, to determine what content is obscene.
2. The Forum Shopping Problem
The community standards test allows prosecuting attorneys to shop for
a forum with the most conservative community to help ensure a
conviction. An example of this technique was illustrated in a Sixth
Circuit case, United States v. Thomas,26 ' in which an Internet bulletin
board operator in California was prosecuted in Tennessee because a
United States Postal Inspector downloaded sexually explicit material off
282of Thomas' electronic bulletin board. Rather than prosecuting in
275. Reno II, 217 F.3d at 168-69.
276. Id. at 169.
277. Reno 1, 521 U.S. at 877-78; Reno II, 217 F.3d at 175; see also Rupert, supra note
271, at 137 (providing an example of the "lowest common denominator" effect). Under
Rupert's hypothetical, the Chicago Museum of Contemporary Art posts the nude works of
a photographer on the Internet. Id. Under COPA, if anybody in any community found
the images offensive, the Museum could be held criminally liable. Id.
278. See supra note 192; see also supra text accompanying notes 247-49.
279. Miller, 413 U.S. at 33 (stating that the reason for applying the contemporary
community standards of the average person "is to be certain that, so far as material is not
aimed at a deviant group, it will be judged by its impact on an average person, rather than
a particularly susceptible or sensitive person - or indeed a totally insensitive one") (citing
Roth, 354 U.S. at 489).
280. See, e.g., Thomas, 74 F.3d at 705 (filing suit in the Western District of Tennessee
for a Web site originating in the Northern District of California).
281. 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
282. Id. at 705-06. The district court convicted Robert Alan and Carleen Thomas
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462 and 1465. Id. Section 1462 provides, in relevant part:
Whoever brings into the United States ... or knowingly uses any ... interactive
computer service .. .for carriage in interstate or foreign commerce -- (a) any
obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion-picture film,
paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent character ... Shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both ....
18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1994).
Section 1465 provides, in relevant part:
Whoever knowingly transports or travels in, or uses a facility or means of,
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California, prosecutors took advantage of more conservative
communities in Tennessee.23
Therefore, as predicted by the Court in Reno I, forum shopping
empowered a conservative community to dictate what content was
284
permissible on the Internet. Such forum shopping will likely result in a
chilling of free speech on the Internet.2 s5 Web publishers will be hesitant
to post material on the Web that they fear the more conservative
communities will deem inappropriate, even though that speech might be
acceptable elsewhere. 2"' This, in turn, will result in self-censorship of
Internet content that many people find valuable. For example, one could
imagine Web publishers being hesitant to post materials on topics such as
AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases, general sexual health
information, art exhibits (nudes), social and dating services, and even
political material about world leaders (i.e., Ken Starr's investigation of
President Clinton's executive affairs). In other words, legitimate content
with serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value (SLAPS
content), that normally receives strict First Amendment protection, and
that is normally measured by a national rather than a local standard,"'
interstate or foreign commerce or an interactive computer service . . . in or
affecting such commerce for the purpose of sale or distribution of any obscene,
lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, film, paper, letter, writing,
print, silhouette, drawing, figure, image, cast, phonograph recording, electrical
transcription ... or any other matter of indecent or immoral character, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
283. See Doherty, supra note 193, at 289 & n.215 (explaining that an undercover
United States Postal inspector downloaded the sexually explicit images while in
Tennessee); see also Eric Handelman, Comment, Obscenity and the Internet: Does the
Current Obscenity Standard Provide Individuals with the Proper Constitutional
Safeguards?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 709, 710-11 (1995) (arguing that "the Miller test is too vague
to provide adequate due process protection to a potential defendant in an Internet
obscenity case").
284. Reno 1, 521 U.S. 844, 877-78 (1997).
285. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (finding that "Web site
operators and content providers may feel an economic disincentive to engage in
communications that are or may be considered to be harmful to minors and thus, may self-
censor the content of their sites").
286. Id.; see also Jacobson, supra note 263, at 250 (predicting that COPA "will reduce
speech on the Internet to the level of what is acceptable for children"); Miller, supra note
263, at 172 (speculating that under COPA Web publishers will censor themselves to make
certain they will not be prosecuted); Rupert, supra note 271, at 144 (arguing that due to
the prohibitive costs of implementing age verification systems, Web publishers will choose
to censor their own material to ensure compliance with COPA).
287. The third prong of Miller's obscenity test, and the third prong of COPA's
definition of material harmful to minors, requires that the banned material, when taken as
a whole, "lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Miller v. California,
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would be jeopardized by the potential for arbitrary rulings by local lay
218juries .
B. Attempting to Craft a Community Standards Test to the Internet
There has been a tremendous amount of commentary concerning
Congressional efforts to draft legislation to protect minors from
pornography on the Internet.189  Most of that commentary has been
critical of Congressional statutes such as the CDA and COPA.'9° As a
result, commentators have proposed several alternative solutions to the
problem. This section outlines some of those alternatives.
1. Applying a Virtual Community Standard
One commentator, Angela Wu, argued for several alternatives toS 291
government regulation of sexually explicit material on the Internet.Wu theorized that a virtual community standard could be applied to
413 U.S. 15, 31, 24 (1973); 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (Supp. IV 1999). Unlike the patently
offensive and prurient interest prongs, which utilize local community standards, the
SLAPS prong is measured by a national standard. Reno I, 521 U.S. 844, 873 (1997)
(describing the SLAPS prong as a "societal value" requirement that "allows appellate
courts to impose some limitations and regularity on the definition by setting, as a matter of
law, a national floor for socially redeeming value"); see also Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497,
500 (1987).
288. Lewis, supra note 263, at 163-64. Lewis argues that the function of a jury in a
criminal trial is to make findings of fact, not to make subjective determinations as to the
"reprehensibleness or moral quality of the conduct .... In the absence of any palpable
standard, it can only be subjective." Id. at 163. Lewis goes on to compare the community
standard test to Justice Stewart's admission in Jacobellis v. Ohio, that although he could
not settle on a workable standard to define obscenity, "I know it when I see it." Id. at 164
(citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)). The contemporary community
standard test offers the same solution as Justice Stewart, the only difference is that the
arbitrary determination is made by a jury rather than a judge. Not only is this
determination not suitable to a jury, but it is also "an abandonment of logical thought, an
application of the subjective bias of personal morality, and subsequently a failure to apply
a biological understanding of human sexuality." Id.
289. See, e.g., Doherty, supra note 193, at 286 (arguing that COPA's community
standard test will be extremely difficult to apply to the Internet); Jacobson, supra note 263,
at 247-50 (predicting that COPA will not survive a strict scrutiny analysis); Lewis, supra
note 263, at 158-161 (arguing that the Miller test cannot be applied to the Internet because
posting material on a Web site is not analogous to a newsstand selling sexually explicit
magazines); Miller, supra note 263, at 175-76 (arguing that Web publishers will censor
their own content for fear of being prosecuted under COPA); Rupert, supra note 271, at
143-44 (concluding that COPA unconstitutionally restricts speech); Wu, supra note 5, at
301-303 (prosposing several alternatives to government regulation of the Internet).
290. See, e.g., supra note 289.
291. Wu, supra note 5, at 301.
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292
determine what material is acceptable on the Internet . Wu envisioned
the creation of an organization to formulate a uniform international• 293
virtual community standard.
2. "Netizen" Regulation
Another alternative to government regulation Wu identified was
"netizen regulation., 294 According to Wu, "'[n]etizen regulation' simply
refers to individual Internet users actively participating to 'regulate' the
Internet. ' '291 Internet users have the responsibility to govern themselves
without outside interference from the government 96 Wu argued that
Internet users have already instituted an informal code of behavior
termed "netiquette., 297 As an example of how self-regulation works, Wu
explained that users can "flame" Web sites that post inappropriate
material.2 98 "Flaming" is a "verbal attack in cyberspace., 299 The rationale
is that the rest of the Internet community will scorn those who violate the
code of behavior) °°
3. Applying the Community Standard of the Sender
Donald Stepka endorsed a community standard test for the Internet
that would involve a slight twist of COPA: applying the community
standard of the sender as opposed to the receiver.3 °' Stepka identified
three communities that could potentially make up the COPA
292. Id. at 302 ("Since the Internet is often described as a 'virtual community,' it would
be appropriate for the Internet to have a 'virtual community standard,' especially with
respect to what material is acceptable.").
293. Id. Wu hypothesized that the United Nations could create an executive board
responsible for forming a "Virtual Community Organization" (VCO) composed of
Internet users from around the world. Id. The VCO would then be responsible for
articulating a uniform virtual community standard. Id.
294. Id. at 301. "Netizen" has been defined as: "a citizen of the Internet." NEWTON,
supra note 5, at 469.
295. Wu, supra note 5, at 301 n.234.
296. Id. at 302 ("With 'netizen regulation,' the Internet is not subject to government
control, but rather, is policed by members of its own 'community."').
297. Id. at 301. "Netiquette" is defined as: "proper behavior on Internet." NEWTON,
supra note 5, at 469.
298. Wu, supra note 5, at 301-02.
299. Id. at 302 n.236 (citing Lawrence Lessing, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J.
1743,1746 n.10 (1995)). Newton's Telecom Dictionary defines "flaming" as: "send[ing] an
insulting message, usually in the form of a tirade, sent via online postings." NEWTON,
supra note 5, at 283.
300. NEWTON, supra note 5, at 468 ("One usually tries to be a good net.citizen, lest
one be flamed, i.e., insulted through e-mail.").
301. Stepka, supra note 267, at 935-37.
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community: the virtual community (or cyber-community); the
community where the material originated (the community of the sender);
and the community where the material was received (the community of
the receiver)."" Stepka dismissed the virtual community standard
deeming it unrealistic to ignore the fact that computer users are still
members of their geographic communities when they are on the
Internet.
303
Stepka reasoned that applying the community standard of the receiver
results in adhering to the standards of the strictest community. 34 Since
the sender cannot control where his or her content is downloaded, all
Web publishers must adhere to the strictest possible geographic
community standard to ensure compliance with the law. 30 A Web
publisher, however, can control where the Web site itself is located; thus,
Stepka would have the Web publisher's local community standard
apply.
4. Lewis' Scientific Approach: Prosecutors Must Show Actual Harm
Phillip E. Lewis, rejecting the constitutionality of the CDA and
COPA, suggested another means for drawing the line between protected
302. Id. at 936-40.
303. Id. at 939. Stepka also believed the virtual community standard would be
unworkable because "it is hard to see why there should be exactly one such community
that comprises all and only cyberspace." Id. Indeed, considering the Internet is "as
diverse as human thought," applying one community standard to all of cyberspace is just
as problematic as applying one real-world community standard to all of the geographic
communities of the world. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Stepka,
supra note 267, at 939.
304. Stepka, supra note 267, at 928. If the community standard of the receiver is used
to determine obscenity, "[a]ll communities will have their standards set by the least
tolerant community, in violation of the fundamental principle that communities should set
their own standards." Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 939. Stepka argued that the downloading of sexually explicit materials on
the Internet is distinguishable from those cases outlawing the sending of obscene materials
to recipients via regular mails. Id. at 941. Stepka asserted that the affirmative
downloading of materials from the Internet is more analogous to those cases where the
consumer travels to a merchant's shop to buy such materials. Id. at 939. In those cases,
Stepka argued, it makes the most sense to apply the standards of the community of the
merchant or the Web publisher, not the purchaser's community. Id. As long as the
materials are viewed in private, there is no reason to involve the community of the
purchaser. See id. Under this argument, the community of the seller should have some
say as to what kind of products are sold in their community. See id. Stepka noted,
however, that if the supplier sent out a bulk email, he would then be liable to the
community standards of those communities he had sent to. Id. at 940.
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speech and unprotected obscenity.3 7  According to Lewis, Internet
content should only be considered obscene (i.e., harmful to minors)
where a person is actually harmed by the creation and dissemination of
such content. 3°8 Lewis did not see a reason for treating the crime of
disseminating obscene materials to children any differently from other
garden-variety crimes where actual harm must be proven.3°9 Lewis
argued that proving sexually explicit materials caused objective harm can
be established just as causation of objective harm is proven in other
crimes.3m
III. TOWARD A SOLUTION THAT PROTECTS CHILDREN WITHOUT
TRAMPLING UPON THE FIRST AMENDMENT
We have exported to the world, through the architecture of the
Internet, a First Amendment in code more extreme than our
own First Amendment in law."'
This Comment argues that the contemporary community standard test
• • 312
used in COPA is unconstitutional. COPA allows the community of the
Web surfer, the receiver of Web content, to determine whether that
content is harmful to minors."3 This approach is overly burdensome of
free speech because Web publishers have no control over which
communities download their material.34 Consequently, the least tolerant
communities are given the power to define what content may be
published on the Internet.3"5 Rejecting COPA, therefore, the question
remains: how can children be protected from harmful content on the
Internet? The commentators above advanced several alternatives to
COPA.316 This Comment rejects those arguments in favor of leaving
parents with the responsibility of protecting their children from harmful
307. Lewis, supra note 263, at 166-67.
308. Id. at 166.
309. See id. & n.128. According to Lewis, if Internet content does not cause objective
harm, "there is not practical justification in forbidding such material." Id. at 166 n.128.
Lewis also stressed that "[t]he mere possibility that someone might view a particular
material and be offended by it does not qualify as a 'harm."' Id. at 166 n.129.
310. Id. at 166-67.
311. LESSIG, supra note 2, at 167 (emphasis added).




316. See supra Part ll.B.
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materials on the Web. This approach, though admittedly imperfect, is
the best method available to protect children while preserving the online
public's First Amendment rights.
A. Applying a Virtual Community Standard
Wu suggested that a virtual community standard be applied to govern
content on the Internet."7 Applying a single virtual or cyber community
standard is problematic because the Internet is neither small nor
localized."8 Considering that the Web is "as diverse as human thought,"
it is unsuitable to define the Web as a single community." 9 Furthermore,
Wu conceded that the virtual community standard may be completely
320disregarded by Internet users.
One could, however, identify individual communities within the
Internet.32' People who regularly log on to a particular type of Web site
share a common interest and are therefore members of an online
community.322  For example, those people who frequently visit news-
related Web sites could constitute a news community. The news
community could be further subdivided into a sports-news community
and a financial-news community. One could also imagine communities
consisting of consumers, pet owners, entertainment fans, various
religious groups, and any other interest that can be found on the
Internet, including an adult entertainment community.
323
317. See supra Part Il.B.1.
318. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (finding that there is no
single entity that makes up or controls the Web). The Court stated that:
No single organization controls any membership in the Web, nor is there any
single centralized point from which individual Web sites or services can be
blocked from the Web. From a user's perspective, it may appear to be a single,
integrated system, but in reality it has no centralized control point.
Id.
319. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,842 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
320. Wu, supra note 5, at 303.
321. Sean P. Egan et al., Is There Anybody Out There?, BLINK MAG. (Oct. - Nov.
2000), available at http://www.earthlink.net/blink/oct00/cover.html (describing five
Internet communities (love, support, hobby/special interest, business, identity) and their
corresponding Web sites).
322. "Community" is defined as: "I. A neighborhood, vicinity, or locality. 2. A
society or group of people with similar rights or interests. 3. A collection of common
interests that arise from an association." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 273 (7th ed. 1999).
323. Indeed, the Microsoft Network (MSN) has a Web site that allows users to locate,
join, and create their own communities. MSN Communities, at
http://communities.msn.com/home (last visited Nov. 20, 2001). Some of the general
communities include: Automotive, Business, Computers & Internet, Entertainment,
Games, Health & Wellness, Home & Families, Lifestyles, Money & Investing, News &
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There are, however, two problems with this approach. First, the courts
may have a difficult time gathering members of these communities to
serve on juries in cases where community standards must be applied.
Empanelling such juries could raise privacy concerns and it is likely that
many members of the adult entertainment community would prefer to
324remain anonymous. Furthermore, it is simply not practical to round up
the members of a virtual community, as they may live hundreds or
thousands of miles apart. Second, it is inherently unlikely that voluntary
members of an adult entertainment community will find the material on
a given adult Web page to be "patently offensive" or without any
"value." '325 In other words, a jury made up of members of the online
adult entertainment community will be stacked against the prosecution,
making enforcement of such a law futile.
B. Netizen Regulation
Wu further theorized that the citizens of the Internet (netizens) can,
and often do, self-regulate content on the Internet.326 The weakness of
allowing Internet users to regulate themselves is the lack of any proof
that it works.3 2 ' The threat of flaming by the Internet community may do
little to deter the publishers of obscene material on the Internet.328 Nor
can the threat of flaming deter children from exploring sexually explicit
Web sites either mistakenly or intentionally. Moreover, Congress
created both the CDA and COPA because it did not trust Internet users
to safeguard the interests of children. 329 Self-regulation, by itself, has not
Politics, Organizations, People, Places & Travel, Religion & Beliefs, Schools & Education,
Science & History, Sports & Recreation. Id. Those communities are broken down into
sub-communities. For instance, the Automotive community contains sub-communities for
Cars, Motorcycles and Auto racing. Id. Prodigy also hosts a number of communities.
Prodigy Communities, at http://communities.prodigy.net/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2001).
324. Reno 11, 217 F.3d 162, 171 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that Web sites that install credit
card and age verification systems will experience a loss in traffic because many adults will
not be willing to reveal personal information).
325. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (Supp. IV 1999).
326. See supra Part l.B.2.
327. LESSIG, supra note 2, at 166 (arguing that social norms do little to restrain
controversial speech in cyberspace). Lessig notes that people in cyberspace are "likely to
be more tolerant of dissident views when they know (or believe, or hope) the dissident
lives thousands of miles away." Id.
328. Id. Certainly, the threat of flaming is unlikely to deter businesses that cut a
healthy profit in the publishing of sexually explicit material on the Web. See supra note 4.
329. Section 1402 of the Child Online Protection Act of 1998: Congressional Findings,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-736 (1998), states that "while the industry has
developed innovative ways to help parents and educators restrict material that is harmful
to minors through parental control protections and self-regulation, such efforts have not
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proven to be an effective safeguard of children on the Internet.33
C. Applying the Community Standard of the Sender
Stepka argued that it is both equitable and constitutional to hold Web
publishers accountable to their own geographic community.3 ' This
approach allows the community of the sender, not the receiver to set the
standard for what sexually explicit material rises to the level of
unprotected obscenity.332
This approach appears more equitable than COPA's scheme because
Web publishers are only charged with comprehending the moral
standard of their own geographic community, rather than the standard of
all the communities that their material may reach.333  However, the
analogy of a Web site to a "brick and mortar" store is not an exact
match.3  The rationale behind the community standard is to allow the
members of a geographic community to have some control over the type
of businesses transacted in their neighborhood.335 A particular Web site
often has little or nothing to do with the physical locality within which its
operator lives. It is conceivable, and in a small town probably even
likely, that no members of the Web publisher's geographic community
will ever see the material or the Web site.336 Under what rationale, then,
should the geographic community of a Web publisher have control over
what content that person publishes on the Internet? There is no
relevance between the Web publisher's geographic community and his or
provided a national solution to the problem of minors accessing harmful material on the
World Wide Web." Id.
330. Id.
331. See supra Part 11.B.3.
332. Id.
333. Stepka, supra note 267, at 939-40.
334. See Reno I1, 217 F.3d 162, 175 (3d. Cir. 2000) (noting that "[u]nlike a 'brick and
mortar outlet'.., the uncontroverted facts indicate that the Web is not geographically
constrained").
335. Lewis, supra note 263, at 160.
336. Given the myriad of different Internet hosts and Web sites on the Internet, most
people barely scratch the surface of all the possibilities on the Internet. In January 2001, it
was estimated that there were approximately 100 million Internet hosts worldwide.
Telecordia: Number of Internet Hosts Reaches 100 Million, NUA INTERNET SURVEYS
(Jan. 12, 2001), at http://www.nua.ie/surveys/index.cgi?f=VS&artid=905356335&rel=true.
Internet hosts were defined to include routers, Web servers, mail servers, work stations,
and ports in ISPs' modem banks. Moreover, a 1999 study estimated that there were
approximately 5 million individual Web sites online. Netcraft: 5 Million Web Sites on the
WWW, NUA INTERNET SURVEYS (April 20, 1999), at http://www.nua.ie/surveys/
index.cgi?f=VS&artid=905354851 &rel=true.
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her Web site.337
This alternative also triggers policy implications. It is predictable that
Web publishers of sexually explicit content will be encouraged to set up
shop in geographic communities that are more liberal and less restrictive
of sexually explicit material to avoid liability. This problem is already
widespread in the case of "brick and mortar" adult entertainment
businesses.338 Nevertheless, it is arbitrary and unconstitutional to convict
a person of a crime and sentence them to imprisonment for publishing
material on a Web site based in Tennessee, when the same person could
legally post the same material in New York.339
Finally, it is questionable whether this approach will actually
accomplish the expressed goal of protecting children from harmful
material on the Internet. Web publishers who earn a profitable business
by posting sexually explicit material will likely relocate to communities
that are more liberal. Additionally, a large percentage of the sexually
explicit material on the Web originates from communities outside the
United States.340 Material originating from outside the United States is
337. Reno 11, 217 F.3d at 169 (describing the Internet's "geographically borderless
nature") (citation omitted). Explaining the unique nature of the Internet, the Third
Circuit stated:
[T]he Internet "negates geometry ... it is fundamentally and profoundly anti-
spatial. You cannot say where it is or describe its memorable shape and
proportions or tell a stranger how to get there. But you can find things in it
without knowing where they are. The [Internet] is ambient -- nowhere in
particular and everywhere at once."
Id. (quoting Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 956 (Ariz. 1998)).
338. Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1985); Young v. Am. Mini
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (1976) (upholding zoning ordinances that segregated adult
movie theatres to certain parts of town).
339. This was Justices Harlan's and Brennan's argument when they attempted to
convince the rest of the Supreme Court that a local community standards test was
unconstitutional. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) ("We thus reaffirm the
position taken in Roth to the effect that the constitutional status of an allegedly obscene
work must be determined on the basis of a national standard. It is, after all, a national
Constitution we are expounding.") (citation omitted); Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S.
478, 488 (1962) (asserting that a localized community standard test would have "the
intolerable consequence of denying some sections of the country access to material, there
deemed acceptable, which in others might be considered offensive to prevailing
community standards of decency"); see also Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335
(1946) (noting that "the constitutional limits of free expression in the Nation" should not
"vary with state lines").
340. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1999). In a study conducted in
July 1998, Dr. Donna Hoffman estimated that forty percent of the content on the Web
originates from outside the United States. Id. Moreover, European Internet firms are
increasingly turning to pedaling online pornography in an effort to increase revenues.
ZDNet (UK): European Companies Turn to Porn For Profits, NUA INTERNET SURVEYS
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beyond the jurisdictional reach of COPA.341 Inasmuch as the Internet
knows no boundaries, it is impossible for the government, at least with
present technology, to completely restrict sexually explicit material on
the Internet.142  COPA, or Stepka's proposed alternative, therefore,
would only serve to deter non-profit and small businesses based in the
United States from publishing materials on the Internet that may have
some sexual content while having no effect on businesses based in
foreign countries. Such a result may prove to be more of a disservice,
than a benefit to the public.
343
D. Lewis' Scientific Approach
Lewis suggested that there should only be liability for disseminating
material that is harmful to children on the Internet when there is an
344objective finding of actual harm. Lewis' approach would allow courts
to eliminate the use of the "disparate and arbitrary" community standard
test.
3 45
Nevertheless, Lewis' solution would do little to soothe the concerns of
parents in America. First, it has not been conclusively proven that
obscene material does in fact harm children. Therefore, the
prosecution in an Internet obscenity case would probably have a difficult
time proving actual harm. Parents would have to argue that viewing such
material does in fact harm children, even if science has not be able to
(Aug. 8, 2001), at http://www.nua.com/surveys/index.cgi?f=VS&artid=905357062&rel=
true.
341. Reno II, 217 F.3d 162, 172 (3d. Cir. 2000) (noting that the district court found that
"even if COPA were enforced, children would still be able to access numerous foreign
Web sites containing harmful material") (citing ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 477
(E.D. Pa. 1999)).
342. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 496 (E.D. Pa. 1999) ("Here, this Court's
finding that minors may be able to gain access to harmful to minors materials on foreign
Web sites, non-commercial sites, and online via protocols other than http demonstrates
the problems this statute has with efficaciously meeting its goal.").
343. The plaintiffs in Reno It provide a variety of services to the public and most of the
information they provide is available for free. See Brief for Appellee at 3; Reno, 31 F.
Supp. 2d at 484. They provide information on a variety of issues, some of them of a sexual
nature. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 489. Plaintiffs and their users post, read, and respond to
content, including "resources on obstetrics, gynecology, and sexual health; visual art and
poetry; resources designed for gays and lesbians; information about books and stock
photographic images offered for sale; and online magazines." Id.
344. See supra Part 1.B.4.
345. Id.
346. See Playboy Entm't Group v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 710, 715-16 (D.
Del. 1998) (finding that the Government failed to present any "clinical evidence linking
child viewing of pornography to psychological harms").
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quantify the harm. Second, Lewis' technique is reactive, rather than
proactive because it does not restrict harmful speech until after the
damage is done.347
E. Leaving the Safety of Children in the Hands of Technology and Their
Parents
Given the current state of technology, the only constitutional means to
protect children from harmful materials on the Web is through the use of
blocking or filtering technology, combined with the oversight of parents
or guardians. 4 ' This method for restricting minors' access to sexually
explicit material gives parents the freedom of choice; it allows parents to
decide what type of content is appropriate for their child. 349 At the same
time this method avoids limiting the adult population's access to
materials that are only suitable for children. 30 Furthermore, this solution
is not at odds with the holding in Mainstream Loudoun, or to the lawsuits
filed to enjoin CHIPA.3 1' This Comment simply proposes that parents
must determine for themselves whether to employ the use of software
filters; it does not endorse the view that the government should mandate
their use.35 2
347. Indeed, such an after-the-fact approach harkens back to the dilemma Justice
Stevens attempted to remedy in Pacifica. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49
(1978) ("To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears
indecent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first
blow .... [T]hat option does not.., avoid a harm that has already taken place.").
348. Parental oversight is important because of the inherent limitations of software
filters. See supra notes 210-12. Flawed though the technology may be, many filters allow
parents to manually correct their failings. Digital Chaperones, supra note 206. Some
filters allow parents to block or unblock Web sites in their own discretion. Id. Thus, when
a child complains that a legitimate Web site has been blocked, their parent can correct the
software's mistake. Furthermore, many filters also keep a log of the Web sites that a user
visits. Id. This Web site tracking feature allows parents to keep track of their child's
online activities. Id. This tool could also be used to deter children from attempting to
access adult Web sites for fear that their parents will learn of these attempts.
349. This approach is harmonious with the Supreme Court's holding in Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (explaining that parents have a constitutional right to
raise their children as they see fit).
350. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1957) (cautioning that legislation
designed to protect children from obscenity must be "reasonably restricted to the evil with
which it is said to deal," so as not to "reduce the adult population ... to reading only what
is fit for children").
351. See supra Part I.D.4.
352. See Rupert, supra note 271, at 147 ("COPA's backers miss the point when they
fret that mandated use of such software would be tantamount to private censorship.
Congress should not mandate its use at all. Parents should decide for themselves whether
to employ filtering and blocking software to curtail their child's Web access.").
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Blocking software may be installed on home computers, enabling
parents to limit their child's Web usage by blocking certain types of Web
sites." Some Internet Service Providers (ISPs) also provide blocking
devices. Concededly, blocking software is not perfect. Filtering can be
both over and under inclusive.35 Nevertheless, when filtering technology
is combined with vigilant parental oversight, it is likely to be far more
effective at protecting children than COPA.356
COPA's reach is limited to commercial Web sites that originate inside
the United States."' Blocking software, on the other hand, filters out
sexually explicit material from commercial Web sites as well as non-
commercial Web sites, newsgroups, chat rooms, and any other Internet
capability."" Furthermore, blocking software can also block materials
that originate from foreign countries.359
IV. CONCLUSION
COPA, Congress's second attempt to regulate speech on the Internet,
is an unconstitutional abridgment of the First Amendment. By leaving it
to individual geographic communities to determine whether a Web
publisher should be held criminally liable, the statute places an overly
burdensome restriction on free speech. Since Web publishers cannot
control where their material is downloaded, they will be forced to self-
censor their Web site content to ensure that it will not be found "harmful
to minors" in the strictest communities of America. This Comment
proposes a less restrictive means to protect minors from sexually explicit
material on the Web, while at the same time protecting the freedom of
353. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 477, 492 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (noting that parents can
purchase blocking software for approximately forty dollars); see also Part I.D.4.
354. See discussion supra Part I.D.4; see also LESSIG, supra note 2, at 177. Lessig
points out that the World Wide Web Consortium has already created a filtering system
called "Platform for Internet Content Selection" or "PICS." Id. PICS operates under a
two-step process: first it rates and labels content, then it filters content according to those
ratings. Id.
355. Reno II, 217 F.3d 162, 171 (3d Cir. 2000); Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 492; see also
supra notes 210-12; Rupert, supra note 271, at 147 (noting that one filter blocked sites
mentioning actor Dick Van Dyke).
356. See supra note 348; Rupert, supra note 271, at 147.
357. Reno I, 217 F.3d at 167-68; see also LESSIG, supra note 2, at 166 (arguing that
laws are an imperfect method to regulate cyberspace because speech that is illegal in one
country may be legal in another).
358. Rupert, supra note 271, at 147 ("[Fjiltering and blocking software can block out
harmful material not under COPA's protective umbrella - international sites and non-
Web-based materials.").
359. Id.; see also Jacobson, supra note 263, at 254 (stating that a tagging and filtering
scheme can restrict undesired content originating outside of the United States).
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expression for adults. Allowing parents to purchase their own tagging,
filtering, and blocking software enables them, not the government, the
freedom to choose what types of Web sites their children can access.
Furthermore, this method avoids an unconstitutional intrusion on the
rights of adults to choose what content they wish to access on the Web.' 6°
360. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000). The Supreme
Court stated it best:
The Constitution exists precisely so that opinions and judgments, including
esthetic and moral judgments about art and literature, can be formed, tested, and
expressed. What the Constitution says is that these judgments are for the
individual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or
approval of a majority. Technology expands the capacity to choose; and it denies
the potential of this revolution if we assume the Government is best positioned
to make these choices for us.
Id.
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